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The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) leaves Iran with residual 
capabilities that positions it for the rapid development of nuclear weapons should it 
abandon the deal. This thesis examines how the JCPOA affects Saudi Arabia and what 
actions the Saudis are likely to take. The Saudi premise of “whatever they have, we’ll 
have” in regard to Iran leans toward a Saudi Arabian nuclear hedging strategy, but is it 
feasible? This thesis proposes a model that explores the interaction of threat, domestic 
factors, and current international nonproliferation regimes and how they drive a nation 
toward nuclear hedging. The model is applied to the cases of Pakistan, a nuclear 
proliferate nation, and Japan, the archetypical hedging nation, and later to Saudi Arabia. 
This comparative case study finds that despite its national will, technological factors—
such as an impoverished scientific community—make Saudi Arabia’s nuclear hedging 
untenable at this time. In addition to technical capability, the presence or absence of 
strong alliances factor into the national decision to hedge or proliferate. This thesis 
concludes by offering insight into when the United States should reexamine the Saudi 
Arabian case and what it should consider if the Saudis consider nuclear optionality.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The process of negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
between leading members of the international community and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran has illuminated the technical progress of Iran’s nuclear program. The negotiated 
plan leaves a foundation for a nuclear-breakout capability in Iran in exchange for 
enhanced nuclear safeguards and a limited enrichment capacity. However, Iran’s 
continuing nuclear capability does not eliminate concerns among its neighbours including 
Saudi Arabia. This thesis poses the following questions: How does the revelation of 
Iran’s progress and capability motivate Saudi Arabia to acquire a nuclear capability to 
match or surpass Iran? If Saudi Arabia chooses to develop a nuclear capability, what path 
would it likely take—such as hedging by developing a sufficient capability to enable a 
nuclear breakout—and which technical capabilities would it need to develop? Finally, 
assuming Saudi Arabia’s progress, what are the policy/treaty implications presented to 
the nuclear proliferation regime?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The 2015 National Security Strategy reads, “No threat poses as grave a danger to 
our security and well-being as the potential use of nuclear weapons by irresponsible 
states or terrorists.”1 The United States recently led the initiative reached in the JCPOA 
among the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States, Russia, China, France, and the 
United Kingdom, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, as 
well as Germany (P5+1). The agreement attempts to align Iran’s nuclear intentions with 
this policy and reinforces the norm set forth in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), under which signatories agree not to pursue nuclear weapons. 
The JCPOA negotiations sought to achieve the goals of the NPT by focusing on 
                                                 
1 White House, The National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 
11.  
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enrichment levels, weapon-design activities, reactor designs, and the limit of on-hand 
nuclear material to limit a nuclear-breakout capability. The agreement reaffirms the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the inspection regime to ensure 
compliance with the agreement while the threat of future sanctions should encourage 
Iran to uphold the treaty. As evident in Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s 2015 
campaign to deter U.S.–Iranian negotiations as well as the Saudi Arabian monarchy’s 
vocal concerns, the JCPOA has exacerbated the volatile security landscape of the Middle 
East. Specifically, the JCPOA process has reinvigorated the security concerns of Saudi 
Arabia, which already has difficult relations with Iran.  
The United States has led efforts to reassure the Kingdom in this tumultuous time. 
However, in light of America’s withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan and President 
Obama’s 2009 speech in Prague deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. 
security policy—which alarmed key U.S. allies about the reliability of Washington’s 
extended deterrence guarantees—the Saudis may be rethinking their basic security 
position. Saudi insecurity has been compounded by Pakistan’s reluctance to contribute to 
the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, Egypt’s chronic instability, Syria’s descent into chaos, 
and the role of Iranian-backed Shia militias in challenging the regional security 
architecture. The tenuous Saudi monarchy has good reasons to reassess its position. 
These research questions build on Steven R. McDowell’s thesis from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), which analyzed the significance of Saudi Arabia’s purchase 
of Chinese CSS-2 missile systems for potential nuclear proliferation. Specifically, this 
thesis updates the prognosis through reevaluating the facts since McDowell’s publication 
13 years ago.2 McDowell’s thesis concluded that Saudi Arabia might develop its own 
nuclear arsenal if an adversary acquired a nuclear capability and devalued the United 
States’ ability to provide deterrence.3  
                                                 
2 Steven R. McDowell, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear Threat?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2003), 65–68. 
3 Ibid., 63. 
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To explore Saudi nuclear hedging, this thesis takes into account the changing 
Middle-Eastern landscape, which includes the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the 
uptick in regional conflict, the modernization of Saudi strategic-rocket forces, and the 
renewed emphasis on the Saudis’ civil nuclear program. The research focuses on three 
concerns: Iran’s nuclear progress and how that threat motivates the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia to compensate or hedge; the Saudis’ domestic actions should they decide to 
compensate; and the implications for the nonproliferation regime. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review identifies material necessary for contextually understanding 
the Saudi–Iranian security situation to evaluate Saudi Arabia’s options through 
international-relations theory; looks for and evaluates case studies of states that have 
faced the specter of a nuclear-armed adversary while taking into account the dynamic 
nature of the present; and places the findings in a context applicable to policy. 
The antagonistic nature between Saudi Arabia and Iran sheds light on the present 
situation. F. Gregory Gause’s article, “Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold 
War,” provides insight into the Iranian and Saudi Arabian relationship, which is often 
oversimplified as a bipolar arrangement of Shia versus Sunni vying for power in the 
Middle East. Gause argues that a new cold war of two powers struggling for regional 
hegemony has broken out through the influence of regional proxies that sometimes cross 
sectarian lines.4 This work provides context for Saudi Arabia’s balance-of-power options 
in the wake of the JCPOA framework.  
As a primer to the international-relations theories at play between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, Simon Mabon in Saudi Arabia & Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East 
breaks down international relations in the Middle East. Mabon illustrates examples of 
regionally applied problem-framing from the realist and constructivist schools to provide 
                                                 
4 Gregory Gause, “Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War,” The Brookings Doha 




depth and context to Saudi–Iranian relations. Mabon recognizes the existential threat that 
a nuclear Iran poses to Saudi Arabia and Tehran’s role in managing the perception. He 
discusses the pro- and anti-Iranian aspects associated with the rivalry.5 
Using the realist lens, John Mearsheimer’s concept of offensive realism in The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics scrutinizes state behavior in an anarchic order. 
Mearsheimer reasons that great powers rationally use offensive military capabilities to 
ensure their survival and hold others at bay because they can never ascertain another 
state’s true intentions.6 This line of reasoning suggests that in a world where there is no 
international “9-1-1,” states have reason to be suspicious of offensive gains by other 
states and may secretly prepare for war.7 In this system, states continually improve their 
security to the greatest extent possible by means at hand. Mearsheimer’s work deserves 
consideration for its direct application to the Saudi–Iranian strategic situation as these 
nations debate the merits of building the ultimate offensive weapon. Offensive realism 
applied to Saudi Arabian security suggests a robust Saudi response to match or surpass 
Iran’s security gains.  
In The Origins of Alliances, Stephen Walt describes alliance balancing as aligning 
with another power to offset a security threat. The security threat that drives balancing 
may come from a rising hegemon that, if left unchecked, will dominate the region.8 Walt 
discusses the benefits and risks vis-à-vis the perception of strength or weakness when a 
state allies with stronger or weaker nations.9 Walt describes the conditions that initiate 
balancing: combining power, emphasizing geographic distance, amassing offensive 
power, or displaying aggressive intentions. Inherent in his hypothesis that states tend to 
balance, an aggressive state provokes others to align against it. This model fits the case of 
                                                 
5 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2013), 61–62. 
6John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2014), 30–31.  
7 Ibid., 32. 
8 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 18. 
9 Ibid. 
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Iran’s nuclear program and the P5+1. Walt provides a framework for evaluating the 
options available to Saudi Arabia in response to an aggressive Iran. Based on this theory, 
one of Saudi Arabia’s options is to secure a stronger alliance with the United States or 
Pakistan. 
Zachary Davis in “The Realist Nuclear Regime” provides a critique of realist and 
idealist approaches to the nuclear proliferation regime by showing how each approach 
preserves the nuclear status quo. He articulates that power and security issues 
simultaneously drive proliferation and restrain some states from pursuing nuclear 
weapons. Davis argues that realist motivations also empower neoliberal institutions that 
potentially moderate the underlying reasons to proliferate.10 The intersection of the 
realist security dilemma and international condemnation provides space for a state to 
consider nuclear hedging. 
In the article “Never Say Never Again,” Ariel Levite examines nations that return 
from the brink of nuclear-weapon acquisition though reversal, restraint, or hedging. 
Levite provides the following definition for nuclear hedging, on which this thesis builds: 
“A national strategy of maintaining, or appearing to maintain, a viable option for the 
relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical 
capacity to produce them from several weeks to several years.”11 While Levite’s 
definition is fuel cycle–centric, this thesis considers other requirements for a nuclear-
hedging strategy, such as building a technical manufacturing base and the prerequisite 
delivery systems. 
To examine the likelihood of nuclear hedging from the liberal perspective, Scott 
Sagan provides a norms-based model in his widely acclaimed article “Why Do States 
Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb.” He argues that security 
                                                 
10 Zachary S. Davis, “The Realist Nuclear Regime,” in The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear 
Weapons Spread and What Results, ed. Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 
1993), 91–92. 
11 Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security 27, 
no. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 69, doi: 10.1162/01622880260553633.  
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dilemmas are not the only drivers that propel or prevent countries from seeking nuclear 
weapons; factors such as prestige can affect the national calculation in either direction.12 
Sagan’s work provides insight into alternative explanations for proliferation and 
nonproliferation as a counterpoint to the realist lens in the Middle-Eastern security 
situation. 
In The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz converse on 
a range of nuclear issues, from nuclear deterrence and terrorism to disarmament. In his 
essay “More May Be Better,” Waltz offers the pros and cons of nuclear deterrence and, 
through his discourse with Sagan, establishes why a nation would want to develop a 
deterrent capability. Waltz asserts that tension between states occurs with unilateral-
capability development, that bipolar capabilities provide predictability, and that 
multipolar capabilities have a calming effect based on uncertainty.13 Applied to the 
Saudi–Iranian situation, Saudi nuclear hedging counters the threat of Iranian nuclear 
advancement and provides regional stability, a point this thesis examines. Waltz also 
presents problems with extended deterrence, a method the United States has informally 
used to keep the Saudis calm in the face of the JCPOA. He asserts that the changing 
calculus of strategic importance, if not congruent among nations, will erode the deterrent 
nation’s will to act on behalf of the weaker nation.14 
There is debate over whether the Saudis are even capable of pacing the Iranians in 
terms of technological progress. Fareed Zakaria speaks to the viability of a Saudi nuclear 
hedge in his op-ed piece entitled “Why Saudi Arabia Can’t Get a Nuclear Weapon.” He 
contends that a lack of indigenous skilled workers and a dearth of manufacturing make a 
                                                 
12 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” 
International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 55, doi: 10.1162/isec.21.3.54. 
13 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, 3rd 
ed. (New York: W. W Norton, 2013), 14–15. 
14 Ibid., 26. 
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Saudi attempt to match Iranian efforts highly improbable.15 Other scholars, such as 
Jeffrey Lewis, contend otherwise, decrying Zakaria’s metrics as inconclusive.16 This 
debate has even attracted recent comment by Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisel, in which he 
asserts that Zakaria might eat his words when the first Saudi-manufactured automobile 
rolls off the assembly line in the next few years.17 This thesis considers this debate in 
deliberating over Saudi Arabia’s ability to hedge. 
Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran in “Living with Nuclear Hedging: the 
Implications of Iran’s Nuclear Strategy” apply Levite’s work to Iran’s past actions and 
relates the study to the Saudi case. Bowen and Moran postulate that the international 
community has reinforced a norm of hedging through the JCPOA, and Saudi Arabian 
hedging is already underway. They offer policy prescriptions for the international 
community to prevent states from undermining the NPT and a further outbreak of nuclear 
hedging.18 This thesis builds on this work, taking into account nuclear hedging 
encompasses other factors than the nuclear-fuel cycle. 
James Russell in “Proliferation in the Middle East and the Security Dilemma” 
provides a succinct overview of irritants in the Middle East that could push Saudi Arabia 
toward nuclear hedging. In 2013, he asserts that the Saudis are content in offshoring 
nuclear security to the United States, but further irritation could drive a change in their 
security calculation. This thesis examines Russell’s key point.19 
                                                 
15 Fareed Zakaria, “Why Saudi Arabia Can’t Get a Nuclear Weapon,” Washington Post, June 11, 
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/saudi-arabias-nuclear-bluff/2015/06/11/9ce1f4f8-1074-
11e5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.html.  
16 Jeffrey Lewis, “Sorry, Fareed: Saudi Arabia Can Build a Bomb Any Damn Time It Wants To,” 
Foreign Policy, June 12, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/12/sorry-fareed-saudi-arabia-can-build-a-
bomb-any-damn-time-it-wants-to/. 
17 Dan Drollette Jr., “View from the Inside: Prince Turki al-Faisal on Saudi Arabia, Nuclear Energy 
and Weapons, and Middle East Politics,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, no. 1 (January 2016): 22, doi: 
10.1080/00963402.2016.1124655. 
18 Wyn Bowen and Matthew Moran, “Living with Nuclear Hedging: The Implications of Iran’s 
Nuclear Strategy,” International Affairs 91, no. 4 (July 2015): 687–707, doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12337.  
19 James R. Russell, “Proliferation and the Middle East’s Security Dilemma,” in Over the Horizon 
Proliferation Threats, ed. James J. Wirtz and Peter R. Lavoy (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2012), 63–64. 
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A sampling of Congressional Research Service reports details technical, political, 
and military aspects of Saudi and Iranian security. An example is Christopher 
Blanchard’s Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations produced in September 2015, 
which gives an up-to-date account of U.S. foreign assistance including military aid as 
well as Saudi relations with Iran. This report details more than $90 billion in U.S. 
military sales to Saudi Arabia since October 2010. These sales include some of the 
nation’s most technologically advanced systems, including Apache Longbow helicopters 
and Patriot air-defense systems.20 Figures such as these demonstrate the robust nature of 
the U.S.–Saudi military relationship. Blanchard explains, “Saudi leaders remain skeptical 
of Iran’s intentions and some non-official but prominent Saudis have suggested that the 
kingdom could seek nuclear ‘parity’ with Iran or other unspecified options when the 
agreement is implemented.”21 He goes on to describe Saudi plans to develop up to 16 
nuclear power plants by 2040 with assistance from Argentina and South Korea.22 These 
accounts build a case for the Saudi hedge and outline a potential path. 
In After the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: A Game Plan for the United 
States, Ilan Goldenberg et al. from the Center for a New American Security provide 
timely, relevant analysis of the “Iran deal,” asserting that it could drive Saudi Arabia 
toward a unilateral approach.23 In further policy analysis, the authors suggest that the 
United States must reassure the Gulf States to prevent their hedging against Iran’s 
enrichment program. Goldenberg et al. also highlight the challenges of achieving a 
formal mutual U.S.–Saudi defense treaty given Saudi Arabia’s human rights challenges. 
In case studies of full nuclear-program development, some states have defied 
international norms to acquire nuclear weapons. Among the cases of India, Pakistan, Iraq, 
                                                 
20 Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report No. 
RL33533) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 
https:/fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf.  
21 Ibid., 15.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ilan Goldenberg et al., After the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: A Game Plan for the United 
States (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2015), 
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS-Report-Iran-Agreement-oct-2015-final.pdf. 
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North Korea, Israel, and South Africa, Pakistan’s march to nuclear means is the most 
comprehensive case. Feroz Khan’s Eating Grass: the Making of the Pakistani Bomb 
presents an account of how a nation with a struggling economy and technological deficit 
channeled national will in the face of an existential threat to overcome the political, 
economic, and technological barriers to produce the its bomb.24 Reviewing another 
possible path of procurement, Henry Sokolski writes in Underestimated: Our Not So 
Peaceful Future that Saudi Arabia could attempt to buy a weapon from China or Pakistan 
or, at a minimum, seek a technical boost to its civilian nuclear infrastructure to produce a 
weapon.25  
A review of key documents and commitments provides a better definition of the 
nuclear policy regime. These documents range from international treaties and 
agreements, such as the NPT and the JCPOA, to bilateral agreements regarding nuclear 
energy. The core document of the international nuclear-policy regime is the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This document and its associated 
agreements provide international norms based on three pillars: nuclear nonproliferation, 
nuclear disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.26 The primary document was 
signed by 189 nations, and half of those nations ratified the amendment that established 
the IAEA’s access to nuclear sites. Ironically, Iran has only just agreed to the additional 
protocol with the signing of the JCPOA, but Saudi Arabia has yet to adopt the 
amendment. 
The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reinvigorated the Saudi–
Iranian nuclear-security debate. Its signing has drawn foreign and domestic criticism, so 
an in-depth review of its tenets should help frame compliance and violations.  
                                                 
24 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2012). 
25 Henry D Sokolski, Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future (Arlington: 
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2015), 940–95. 
26 United Nations, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),” Accessed September 
11, 2016. https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/. 
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Other applicable regimes include the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MCTR) for which a consortium of 34 nations has agreed to limit missile-technology 
proliferation. The Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group oversee the 
nuclear item “trigger list” that manages nuclear technological trade.27 Key U.S. 
government documents include items such as the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia Concerning Cooperation in Nuclear Energy 
and other Fields.28 This document lays out the strings attached to U.S. nuclear-energy 
assistance; further analysis may uncover that Saudi Arabia does not intend to use U.S. 
assistance to build the majority of its nuclear infrastructure.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
To explain the Saudi–Iranian nuclear-security dilemma, the underlying questions 
of why states proliferate and what factors bring the issue to the forefront of the 
international community’s concern must be addressed. Mearsheimer writes that a rise in 
offensive power in one state creates the need to compensate in another. This theory 
requires that Saudi Arabia match an Iranian threat. Waltz observes that divergent national 
values between the United States and Saudi Arabia leave the Saudis alone to contend 
with Iranian aggression. Bowen contends that the international community has 
established a new norm, yet Iran has supplied the road map for any other state to achieve 
a nuclear hedge. A potential explanation for Saudi Arabian hedging is a combination of 
approaches to create an additive model, one that considers threats plus domestic 
indicators, such as increased defense spending and investment in technological 
infrastructure, balanced against international norms as an environment ripe for nuclear 
hedging. 
To investigate this hypothesis, three core factors will be unpacked. The first is the 
threat. This thesis examines what factors have driven other nations to hedge or obtain 
                                                 
27 “Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-relevant Transfers,” Missile Technology Control Regime, 
accessed September 6, 2016, http://www.mtcr.info/english/guidetext.html. 
28 A Bill to Restrict Nuclear Cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, H.R. 6298,100th Cong., 
2d sess., 2008, https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/6298/text.  
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nuclear weapons. Examples suggest that if Saudi Arabia views Iran as an existential 
threat, the Saudis will follow through on their rhetoric to match whatever Iran possesses. 
Second are the domestic factors, such as delivery-system development, manufacturing 
infrastructure, or space-launch programs. Third are the external costs to the nation in 
pursuing a nuclear hedge. For example, Iran is watched with scrutiny while Japan is a 
thriving member of the global community. This hypothesis contends Saudi Arabia will 
hedge if it perceives the threat as existential, develops the prerequisite technology, and 
avoids the ire of the international community along the way.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis develops an explanatory model using factors of threat, domestic 
indicators, and international regimes to explain the national decision-space for nuclear 
hedging. This model uses the case studies of Pakistan and Japan. The Pakistani nuclear 
case is significant because it represents a nation that directly pursued a nuclear capability 
in light of a perceived existential threat. The Japan case study explores a country that has 
mastered the nuclear-fuel cycle yet shows restraint in the face of threats from North 
Korea and China. The final portion of the thesis applies the model and findings of the 
case studies to Saudi Arabia to identify relevant policy concerns and recommendations  
Comparative case studies serve as the best method to conduct qualitative analysis 
because of the relatively small number of nations seeking a nuclear hedge. These two 
case studies have a wide variety of dedicated scholarly literature and provide a solid 
foundation for in-depth analysis. Real-time reporting provides the context of events as 
they unfolded during the negotiation and implementation of the JCPOA. For example, 
Greg Jaffe of the Washington Post detailed the King Salman visit in September 2015 that 
ended with a joint U.S.–Saudi declaration of support for the JCPOA.29 Sporadic glimpses 
of political rhetoric provide potential indictors of future state actions, such as Prince 
                                                 
29 Greg Jaffe, “Saudi King Visits U.S. with Iran Deal and Yemen as Major Mutual Concerns,” 
Washington Post, September 4, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/saudi-king-visits-the-white-
house-to-an-uncertain-welcome/2015/09/04/1bc2a81a-5285-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html. 
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Bandar bin Sultan’s expressed displeasure with the Iranian deal as reported by Reuters.30 
Other reporting, including that by Jeffrey Lewis in Foreign Policy, gives insight into 
events such as the reported Saudi upgrade of its ballistic missiles.31 A continued survey 
of reputable media outlets allows for currency of work and guides research as required 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II explores the factors used for 
constructing the model to evaluate hedging potential. Chapter III applies the hedge model 
to the case of Pakistan and its nuclear pursuit. Chapter IV examines Japan and its nuclear 
hedge. Chapter IV applies the model to evaluate Saudi Arabia. Chapter V presents a 





                                                 
30 Sylvia Westall and Angus McDowal, “Former Saudi Spy Chief Says Iran Nuclear Deal Will 
‘Wreak Havoc,’” Reuters, July 16, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/16/uk-iran-nuclear-saudi-
prince-idUKKCN0PQ0GL20150716. 
31 Jeffrey Lewis, “Why Did Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?” Foreign Policy, January 30, 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/why-did-saudi-arabia-buy-chinese-missiles/. 
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II. A MODEL FOR NUCLEAR HEDGING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Winston Churchill debated the merits of whether the United Kingdom needed the 
ability to build atomic weapons.32 Is the capacity to build nuclear weapons enough to 
hold adversaries at bay, however, or are the weapons required? Ben Frankel points to the 
insecurity of the anarchic international system as a primary driver for proliferation. In his 
critique, he recognizes that international regimes, domestic structures, governmental 
politics, national ethos, technological capability, and the character of leadership are 
factors affecting nuclear proliferation.33 Not surprisingly, the same factors that affect 
nuclear hedging are the same ones behind proliferation: an external threat, domestic 
conditions, and the effect of international regimes. What changes is the weight that each 
nation attributes to these factors to produce an acceptable outcome.  
Assessing nuclear hedging requires a framework. This thesis uses a framework 
that merges the observations of Davis, Levite, and Sagan to investigate three critical 
factors affecting nuclear hedging. These three factors are the threat a nation faces in its 
calculation for national security, its favorable or unfavorable domestic factors, and the 
influence of international nuclear regimes. This framework examines each factor in detail 
to extract observables necessary in analyzing potential hedging nations. The push–pull 
nature of these factors and decision space wherein national leadership considers hedging 
are depicted in Figure 1.  
                                                 
32 Levite, “Never Say Never,” 69. 
33 Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow,” in The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons 
Spread and What Results, ed. Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (Portland: Frank Cass, 1993), 37–38. 
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Figure 1.  Simple Nuclear Hedging Model 
If a threat from a nuclear neighbor or its disproportionately larger army is high 
and allying with a nuclear nation is unfeasible, the temptation to proliferate rises. On the 
other hand, domestic factors, such as incongruity between political, military, and 
scientific communities, may stifle proliferation. International regimes enter the picture to 
outline for national leadership the consequences of proliferation decisions and the 
benefits of cooperation. This thesis contends that within the intersection of external 
threats, domestic concerns, and international nuclear regimes lay the conditions for 
nuclear hedging (see Figure 1).  
B. HEDGING AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES  
In 2002, Ariel Levite provided the following definition of nuclear hedging: “A 
national strategy of maintaining, or appearing to maintain, a viable option for the 
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relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical 
capacity to produce them from several weeks to several years.”34 Nuclear hedging by this 
definition exists between nuclear restraint, a posture of forgoing nuclear weapons 
altogether, and acquiring an actual nuclear weapons capability. This section discusses the 
nuclear-weapon state status from the aspects of significant quantity and nuclear tests as 
well as explores hedging motivations.  
The nuclear weapons status deserves exploration to understand the ends of 
hedging. The prevalent trend behind assessing defiance of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and accusing nations of nuclear breakout, such 
as in the case of Iran, focuses on a state attaining the ability to produce the amount of 
fissile material required for an atomic weapon, known as “significant quantity.” The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines significant quantity as the 
thresholds of special nuclear material (SNM) required for a single nuclear weapon.35 The 
IAEA thresholds are as follows:  
8 kg of plutonium (containing more than 95 percent of the isotope Pu-239); 
25 kg of uranium (containing more than 90–95 percent of the isotope U-235); and 
8 kg of U-233.36 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s famous redline speech at the United 
Nations General Assembly in 2012 serves as a prime example of the importance placed 
on the single significant-quantity metric.37 Article II of the NPT clearly articulates that 
nonnuclear-weapon states neither acquire or produce nuclear weapons nor acquire or 
                                                 
34 Levite, “Never Say Never,” 69. 
35 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA Safeguards: Aims, Limitations, Achievements 
(IAEA/SG/INF/4) (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1983), 26. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Jeffrey Heller, “Netanyahu Draws ‘Red Line’ on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Reuters, September 12, 
2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-israel-iran-idUSBRE88Q0GI20120928. 
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accept the means to manufacture them.38 This article presents a security challenge as 
nations often exchange the nuclear-weapon pursuit for promised access to peaceful 
nuclear technology, which may ultimately enable a weapons program. The IAEA serves 
as the watchdog for the treaty with its enforcement of nuclear safeguards. The IAEA’s 
safeguards protocol requires intrusive monitoring of state programs. Should a state refuse 
access, it risks sending signals of possible violations. In addition, if states deny the IAEA 
access, national intelligence entities may mobilize to inform the broader international 
community of possible infractions. Former IAEA Director Mohammed ElBaradei 
describes a state that achieves significant quantity as a “virtual” nuclear-weapon state that 
could go nuclear overnight.39 ElBaradei advocates for further restrictions on enrichment 
and reprocessing capabilities that create these virtual states.40 The counter-argument is 
that states, such as Japan, already possess many significant quantities under articles III 
and IV of the NPT.41  
Criticism of the significant-quantity method intensified with inspection 
controversies in North Korea. In this case, concern grew over North Korea’s nuclear 
reactor at Yongbyon that went online in 1986, one year after its accession to the NPT. 
The reactor could potentially produce six kilograms of plutonium per year.42 This event, 
in conjunction with North Korea’s construction of highly explosive nuclear-reprocessing 
facilities and additional reactors, caused concerns over nuclear breakout.43 The 
                                                 
38 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140) (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, April 1970), 22, 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf. 
39 Caterina Dutto, “ElBaradei Remarks at Georgetown University,” The Carnegie Endowment, 
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40 Ibid.; Enrichment allows a state to raise the level of U235 toward the necessary amount required for 
nuclear weapons. Reprocessing separates nuclear fuels (such as plutonium) from radioactive waste. 
41 IAEA, Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 22. 
42 Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues (CRS Report No. RL34256) 




assessment was that North Korea had enough plutonium for one or two weapons.44 In 
2006, 20 years after the reactor at Yongbyon went online, the North Koreans tested a 
nuclear weapon. In subsequent testimony to Congress in 2012, Director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper referred to North Korea’s first test as a “partial failure.”45 The 
2006 North Korean case demonstrates that significant quantities did not translate into a 
successful nuclear weapons capability. Mastery of the fuel cycle is just one-step toward 
proliferation.  
In a more rigid guideline, a state achieves nuclear-weapon status when it conducts 
a nuclear test. This was the case with Pakistan in 1998. This method has advantages in its 
unambiguous nature, but it does not necessarily signal a resounding nuclear capability. 
North Korea conducted a test in 2006, yet 10 years later, it is still working to miniaturize 
its nuclear weapons to strike the United States.  
Nuclear hedging is an ambiguous area. If a state views hedging as a primary 
means to security, it may develop infrastructure to get as close as possible to a weapon 
without actually assembling or testing it. This type of hedging should include the 
development of delivery means to make a transition as rapidly as possible. Another state 
may see a nuclear program as a bargaining chip to ensure defensive alliances. In present 
conditions, a state may not need to develop military applications; just sending the signal 
of nuclear-weapon exploration may satisfy its security demands. The type of hedging 
defines the state’s approach to capability development and its resulting end state. In either 
case, nuclear-weapon acquisition is the point at which hedging ends.  
Nuclear hedging occurs from the point a nation decides to depart from a position 
of nuclear restraint to explore the military dimensions of a nuclear program. Conversely, 
a country departs from a nuclear-hedging strategy with either a publicized nuclear 
weapons program or the test of a weapon. The secretive nature of nuclear weapons 
programs creates challenges in discovering a significant quantity while nuclear tests 
                                                 
44 Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons, 1. 
45 Ibid., 16. 
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generally represent an intelligence failure. The context of the state’s position and its 
desired end-state are important in identifying nuclear hedging. The next section 
transitions to the factors behind nuclear hedging using the tenets of modern proliferation 
theory to construct a model for hedging. 
C. A HEDGING MODEL FROM PROLIFERATION MODELS 
Scott Sagan offers three distinct models to articulate the cause of proliferation. 
His first model is the security model, based on the realist premise that security needs 
drive states to acquire nuclear weapons. Sagan praises the realist approach because its 
parsimony offers the greatest application in studying past and present proliferation 
cases.46 His domestic-politics model presumes that internal actors in the nation, such as 
the military and the energy complex, advocate for establishing nuclear programs to 
advance their interests at the cost of the nation.47 Sagan also presents a “normative” 
model that centers on the prestige of being a nuclear-weapon state or the alternate 
prestige of nuclear restraint. He uses post–World War II France as an example of a nation 
that used the symbolism of nuclear weapons to ensure its future relevancy.48 Sagan 
concludes that none of the models he describes can answer the proliferation question 
unilaterally, and a model that explains a different case approach is necessary for 
understanding proliferation drivers.49 Since nuclear hedging is a subset of proliferation, a 
similar multi-causal approach is relevant in exploring the interaction between threats, 
domestic factors, and international regimes. 
Zachary Davis articulates a junction of realist and idealist approaches by 
highlighting the offerings of each. He articulates that power and security issues drive 
proliferation and that these same factors restrain some states from pursuing nuclear 
                                                 
46 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” 85. 
47 Ibid., 64. 
48 Ibid., 78. 
49 Ibid., 85. 
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weapons.50 Davis further asserts that these realist motivations also empower the 
neoliberal institutions, such as the United Nations, that have the potential to moderate the 
underlying reasons for proliferating.51 This divide between the realist security dilemma 
and the power of international cooperation through neoliberal institutions provides a 
decision space in which a state considers nuclear hedging. Domestic factors, such as 
national resolve and popular support, can either enable or dissuade a government from 
pursuing a nuclear capability. The degree to which these domestic factors play a part 
affects the national calculus either to pursue nuclear weapons outright or to set conditions 
for future acquisition through hedging. In summary, the need for security provides an 
impetus to acquire weapons; international regimes provide a consequence to that 
acquisition; and domestic drivers either buttress or contradict the national decision to 
pursue nuclear weapons and, if pursuit is the outcome, determine the extent of pursuit.  
The following sections explore each of these factors in depth to identify indicators 
of a nation’s trajectory toward nuclear proliferation. The intent is to examine the 
interaction of these factors in the case studies of Pakistan’s nuclear pursuit and Japan’s 
nuclear hedging as well as delineate the differences and similarities. After this 
delineation, the intent is to apply the model to Saudi Arabia as a potential hedging 
candidate. The following section explores security as the primary factor and uses 
international-relations theory to explain why states “do what they must.” 
D. SECURITY FACTORS 
State security weighs heavily as a factor in the national decision-making calculus 
of whether to seek weapons or hedge. The deciding factor might be that the threat to 
national security outweighs all other benefits of nuclear restraint. At the core of nuclear 
proliferation is the security dilemma: states have a choice to improve their security 
position vis-à-vis their threats or outsource their security through alliance.52 The 
                                                 
50 Davis, “Realist Nuclear Regime,” 91–92. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” 57. 
 20 
persuasive extended-deterrence guarantees of nuclear-weapon states, a prevailing trend 
throughout the 1960s and ‘70s, brought states back from the brink of proliferation.53 This 
section examines threat-based indicators or situations that would cause states to consider 
nuclear hedging.  
John Mearsheimer uses offensive realism to explain state behavior in an anarchic 
order. He reasons that nations exercise power through the use or production of offensive 
military capabilities to ensure their survival and hold others at bay because they can never 
be sure of another state’s intentions.54 Mearsheimer presents a method of framing power 
using the concepts of military and latent capability. Military power is a summation of the 
real military capability a state brings to bear in response to its enemy’s force.55 More 
importantly is the concept of latent power, which is the summation of economic, 
technological, and human resources leveraged to increase military power in a rivalry.56 In 
terms of nuclear hedging, the concept of latent power comes to the forefront. Nuclear 
hedging is essentially a strategy to convert latent power to military power in a reasonable 
timeframe respective to the threat. 
When comparing latent power, Mearsheimer advocates using the gross national 
product (GNP) to measure similar countries.57 He notes that measuring an agrarian state 
against a post-industrial nation using this method skews results; therefore, technological 
and manufacturing capacities deserve consideration in conducting power comparisons.58 
Spikes in technical investment, such as in manufacturing and energy sectors, are 
important when considering whether a state is reevaluating its security paradigm against 
                                                 
53 Richard C. Bush, The U.S. Policy of Extended Deterrence in East Asia: History, Current Views, and 
Implications (Arms Control Series, Paper 5) (Washington, DC: Brookings, February 2011), 1, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/2/arms-control-
bush/02_arms_control_bush.pdf. 
54 Mearsheimer, Power Politics, 30–31.  
55 Ibid., 55. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Mearsheimer, Power Politics, 62. 
58 Ibid. 
 21 
its rivals. Mimicking gestures bear observation as well; Mearsheimer discusses the 
concept of imitation in security competition as applied to defensive realism and argues 
that it applies equally to offensive realism.59 Applying this concept, a rival’s 
technological progress may spark imitation in the threatened state. For example, a sudden 
sharp investment in a nation’s nuclear power infrastructure may spark the same in a rival 
nation. Applied to a potential nuclear rivalry, this interplay may be a graduated process of 
action and response unless one state attempts a nuclear breakout and forces the other to 
follow. 
Whereas John Mearsheimer focuses solely on the concept of offensive power, 
Stephen Walt broadly defines threat as the convergence of “aggregate power, proximity, 
offensive power, and aggressive intentions.”60 Aggregate power is the culmination of all 
state resources such as population, natural resources, wealth, and military power.61 
Proximity represents the relationship between the distance from a rival nation and the 
degree of the threat it presents; a neighboring country presents a far greater threat than a 
nation half the world away.62 Offensive power is the ability to project power to threaten 
another state within an acceptable risk.63 Walt uses the example of German battleships 
during World War I to highlight the threat they posed to England’s security.64 Aggressive 
intentions are those indicated by an aggressor’s history, leader signaling, and offensive 
posture.65  
In The Origins of Alliances, Walt describes options states may take in response to 
threatening states. He describes balancing as aligning with another power to offset a 
security threat posed by another. A security threat that drives balancing may come from a 
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rising hegemon that, if left unchecked, dominates the region.66 Inherent in his hypothesis 
is the tendency of states to balance with the result that an aggressive state will provoke 
others to align against it. In the shadow of a nuclear-armed adversary with hegemonic 
design or delusions of grandeur, states can exercise self-help by pursuing nuclear 
weapons themselves or balancing with other nations against the threat.67 These two 
approaches are not mutually exclusive. A state may choose to ally itself with a stronger 
nation while seeking security self-sufficiency. Walt’s concept of balancing is important to 
nuclear hedging because balancing can provide the necessary time to build the means to 
become self-sufficient. For example, the United States extended its defensive umbrella to 
South Korea but South Korea began exploring its own program in the 1970s.68 
The United States has been relatively successful in stopping proliferation among 
allies through the extension of its nuclear umbrella. It has extended its umbrella to South 
Korea, Japan, and Europe to provide a balance against would-be aggressors. If alliances 
extend deterrence and reduce proliferation incentives, failures of these alliances should 
increase the likelihood of proliferation. Walt explores this phenomenon in his research 
and finds that countries rally to balance the threat of an aggressive nation even though 
these alliances are not necessarily bound ideologically.69  
The question remains how qualitatively to measure the security factors that cause 
a nation to balance against a nuclear threat. This section has reviewed threat in depth and 
found the following factors as indicators of threats that favor nuclear proliferation: 
investment in latent capabilities, aggressive intentions, proximity of rival states that 
engender imitation, and the devaluation of existing alliances. 
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E. DOMESTIC FACTORS 
The perspective of supply and demand helps explain the domestic factors that 
underpin a state’s flirtations with nuclear weapons. Domestically, the demand side 
focuses on why national leadership pushes toward or pulls away from going nuclear. The 
supply side focuses on proliferation by looking at the material factors necessary to 
achieve a nuclear-weapon state status. Japan’s security dilemma, nuclear ability, and 
domestic resistance stand in stark contrast with Libya, which had desire but could not 
produce a nuclear capability indigenously. Demand represents why nations seek 
weapons. Arguably, the threat factor, as discussed in the previous section, falls within 
this rubric, but from a domestic perspective, it only drives leaders interested in hedging or 
reciprocating. This section discusses internal factors that affect the demand side, which 
includes the type of government and the bureaucratic interaction between a nation’s 
political, bureaucratic, and scientific enterprises.  
Arguably, absolute leaders and totalitarian nations can mandate their states to 
proliferate. Autocratic leader Kim Jung-il put North Korea on a nuclear trajectory that his 
son readily followed. F.W. de Klerk brought his country back from its existence as an 
undeclared nuclear state. Though it appears in historical examples that autocratic leaders 
enable their nations to proliferate, democratic leaders, such as President Charles De 
Gaulle and Prime Minister Clement Attlee, have also guided their nations toward nuclear 
arms. If despots were the only ones to pursue nuclear weapons, explaining the Pakistani, 
Indian, and possibly Israeli nuclear cases would prove difficult. Jessica Weeks dispels the 
notion that democratic leaders are beholden to popular will in terms of nuclear pursuit as 
the will of domestic elites holds more substantial weight.70 Dong-Joon Jo and Erik 
Gartzke’s statistical analysis corroborates Weeks’ work, finding no significant difference 
between democracies and reclusive states in their predisposition toward acquisition of 
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nuclear weapons.71 Christopher Way and Jessica Weeks’ subsequent research, in which 
they isolated and studied personality-based regimes, found that these governments were 
relatively supportive of nuclear proliferation.72 Therefore, proliferation can happen in 
any type of government structure, and the elites can sway political leadership toward 
proliferation.  
The question remains as to who affects the nuclear proliferation calculus. Various 
scholars have written about an elite triad of political, scientific, and military-industrial 
communities who come together to enable a nuclear decision. Peter Lavoy describes a 
cycle of nuclear “myth making” by elites who emphasize national insecurity or prestige 
factors to portray nuclear pursuit as the best approach. These actors present the approach 
in a feasible manner that is consistent with political and cultural beliefs that are 
acceptable to decision makers in approving nuclear pursuit. The next few paragraphs will 
discuss why these actors would approve the endeavor or push back on a national decision 
to proliferate.73 
Political concerns can sway a program either way. Politically, it seems logical that 
investment in proliferation technology produces jobs; the other political intuition is that 
proliferation invokes the pride of a self-reliant national-defense force. Another view is 
that if nuclear infrastructure initiates in response to an external threat, such as was the 
case of the Pakistani response to the Indian test of 1974, it can quash domestic quibbles 
and serve as a point of unity for government elites.74 On the other side of the nuclear 
equation, the stigma of nuclear weapons hampers the would-be peacemakers and 
challenges those in power. Monetary costs also compound the complexity of a national 
decision to create the nuclear apparatus required for weaponry.  
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Militaries may refrain from seeking weapons because of the risk associated with 
the program. The military incurs physical vulnerability if the program exposure occurs 
before the creation of an initial operational capability. The military may pushback for 
pure bureaucratic reasons, such as primacy in project leadership or fear that, in a zero-
sum environment, pet-projects will suffer budgetary cuts to fund nuclear initiatives. 
Investment in capacity versus capability can allay these fears and provide a middle 
ground ripe for nuclear hedging.  
The scientific community is a strong force when advocating for investments 
within its sector. This community sees government spending in its sector as a method to 
fund further research and infrastructure. The scientific community was the primary 
advocate for India’s decision to test a peaceful nuclear detonation in 1974; the Indian 
Atomic Energy Commission understated the cost and overstated the benefits to get Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi to accede to their development wishes without regard for how it 
would affect military strategy.75 The opposite perspective portends that the scientific 
community significantly resists a nuclear weapons program because of the pariah effect 
that comes along with it. Downstream effects can lead to restrictions on imported goods 
necessary for research, restricted access to educational opportunities, and lost profits for 
energy laboratories. 
These three “demand” communities each have reasons to advocate for or against 
proliferation, but all three are required for a successful and informed decision to invest in 
nuclear capacity.76 Potential indicators in favor of proliferation are overtures of security 
from national leaders, such as Hosni Mubarak’s statement that though Egypt chooses not 
to have a bomb, it could have one easily if so desired.77 Statements such as this may 
imply a lower national threshold for considering nuclear weapons. The militarization of 
energy projects may serve as an indicator. The international community sanctioned the 
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Iranian Revolutionary Guards Council (IRGC) for being purchasing agents of Iran’s 
atomic enterprise.78 Investment in one or all of these sectors in response to an external 
threat presents potential indicators that merit exploration in the comparative case studies 
of subsequent chapters. 
1. Technological Factors 
Several scholars have attempted to nail down what core capabilities must reside in 
a country to create a nuclear program. One of the first scholars, Stephen Meyers, 
contends that the latent capability to support an indigenous weapons program emerges 
from prerequisite industrial, technical, material, and economic resources.79 Meyers’ 
original work includes ten key requirements, but Jo and Gartzke’s subsequent work pares 
them to seven core requirements. The seven requirements are as follows: known uranium 
deposits; a metallurgical industry; chemical engineering; nitric-acid production; a steady 
electricity-production capacity; nuclear engineers, physicists, and chemists; and 
specialists in electronics and explosives.80 Sagan observes that the overuse of these 
factors has led to an overstatement of the number of states capable of producing a nuclear 
weapon.81 His critique is valid as it considers capability. However, compared to the 
capabilities required by the process outlined in Figure 2, all factors are still necessary to 
foster a weapons program and bear consideration when qualitatively assessing a nation’s 
proliferation potential.  
The next section discusses the process that produces nuclear fuel to illustrate the 
enormity of the process and distinguish core requirements that a country must develop to 
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have a viable hedging option. This process starts with mining uranium from the ground 
and ends short of weapon assembly. 
 
Figure 2.  Nuclear Fuel Cycle82 
Mining and milling uranium, though not much different from processing common 
metals, requires a metallurgist to guide the process and separate the uranium from 
undesired ores and material mined in the process. Natural uranium, U238, comes out of the 
ground with trace amounts of U235, the fissionable isotope of uranium. This process 
requires an intensive amount of U238 to ensure that there is enough U235 available in the 
ore to enrich it to the suitable level. The ore leaves the milling and mining process as 
U3O8, better known as yellowcake. Investment in or diversion of indigenous mining to 
surveyed areas of uranium pockets could provide a useful indicator of a burgeoning state 
nuclear program. 
Today, the gold standard for enrichment uses centrifuge plants for separation. All 
of these processes require access to a large amount of steady and stable power. Another 
potential indicator would be an upgrade to existing or the construction of new power 
infrastructure. This process validates Meyer’s supposition that access to steady power is 
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necessary. Depending on the level of enrichment capability, the state chooses whether to 
enrich the uranium for a weapon or to use the low-enriched uranium to produce reactor 
fuel rods necessary for plutonium. If the state desires plutonium, the fuel rods undergo 
irradiation in a reactor, and the “spent” rods are pulled and reprocessed for the residual 
plutonium. The key observable is a capable reactor and the personnel to run it. It is 
generally at this point in the process that the concern of significant quantity draws the 
attention of the IAEA, which only intensifies when NPT safeguards are found lacking.  
At this point, both processes have produced fissile oxide materials. These oxides 
are turned into metals that require fabrication and machining to use in a nuclear design. 
The process described to this point is an oversimplification of the process, and the cost 
and technical acumen required to produce a nuclear product is immense. For example, if 
a nation desires a weapons program, engineers must design the means for delivery.  
Although Sagan challenges Meyers as well as Jo and Gartzke for falsely 
predicting high levels of latent capability in places like Trinidad and Tobago, their factors 
remain useful in providing qualitative indicators of nuclear activity.83 Sagan pushes for 
multi-causality in his research, but operationalizing these factors to determine latent 
nuclear capabilities is just one way to analyze the problem set. Categorized in the core 
areas of personnel, material, and infrastructure, the indicators paint a potential 
proliferation picture. For example, Iran begins a clandestine interest in centrifuge 
technology in the 1980s, initiates a uranium-mining program, sends students abroad to 
study the nuclear-related scientific disciplines, starts developing ballistic missiles, 
constructs underground scientific facilities, and begins to upgrade infrastructure. Each 
factor on its own caused limited concern, but cumulatively, these factors increased 
concern among the international community, reaching its crescendo when Ahmadinejad 
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had achieved enough technological progress that he could make a credible threat against 
Israel.84  
2. Economic Factors 
Economics play a role as either the carrot or the stick of international 
nonproliferation regimes. Internationally, economic concerns represent an aspect of 
power in the projection of influence in the forms of trade or sanctions. Bruce Russett and 
John Oneil discuss the peaceful effects of economic interdependence. They assert that the 
drumbeats of war mobilize industrial leaders to apply pressure on political elites.85 This 
leads to two effects: hawks within the military-related industries can provide incentives 
while industry captains who stand to lose can provide incentives for peace.86  
Nations use economics to pressure proliferation decisions. Most recently, the 
effect of sanctions has arguably brought Iran to the collective bargaining table. A premise 
of the JCPOA is that the reintegration of Iran into the world market will create conditions 
that force Iranian leadership to realize that the economic benefits outweigh the perceived 
nuclear-weapons costs. The JCPOA is a positive incentive that essentially operationalizes 
the old guns-versus-butter debate. 
The Pressler Amendment is an example of an effort by the United States to 
discourage Pakistani proliferation through negative economic incentives. It linked 
continued U.S. foreign aid with annual executive certification that Pakistan had not 
developed nuclear weapons. The complicating factor in this effort was in the strategic 
backdrop against in which it was employed. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s varying strategic 
importance created discontinuity in the U.S. political approach. The Soviet–Afghan war 
placed significant weight on Pakistan as a power-projection platform through which the 
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CIA needed to funnel weapons to the mujahedeen. President H.W. Bush refused to certify 
Pakistan, triggering the cutoff of economic and military aid.87 Pakistan felt the effects of 
the Pressler Amendment, and the United States found that economic and military aid was 
not sweet enough to entice the Pakistanis from forgoing their weapons. 
The fiscal reality of building nuclear infrastructure is prohibitive, even for 
wealthy nations. The Saudis plan to spend $80 billion to build 16 nuclear reactors.88 Such 
programs come at the expense of domestic initiatives and international business. 
Economic conditions can incentivize politicians to keep programs from crossing 
proliferation thresholds if the economic costs outweigh the security benefits. Chapter IV 
seeks to explore this interaction in the case of Japan.   
F. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
International regimes are effective at providing barriers to nuclear proliferation in 
the sense that they are the sum of all efforts to achieve that outcome.89 Today’s efforts 
include a variety of regimes: the Treaty for the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and, to a lesser extent, the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the IAEA, the Additional Protocol, the United 
Nations Security Resolution 1540, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and other 
multilateral agreements. This section explores each effort and its contribution to 
nonproliferation efforts. 
At the forefront of the nonproliferation regime is the NPT. Its permanent renewal 
in 1995, emulation in other treaties, and widespread ratification serve as proof of its 
lasting efficacy. To this day, only India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudan have not 
signed the treaty. The first three have known and suspected nuclear weapons programs, 
and the latter is presumably too new to statehood to have signed the treaty. The key 
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operational concept of the NPT is that the treaty marries the liberal tradition of 
cooperation among states with the realist premise of security. The basic bargain is access 
to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy for renouncing nuclear weapons and accepting 
compliance monitoring. The benefit of being a nonnuclear-weapon state stems from the 
influx of nuclear technology and the many incentives for not spending money on nuclear 
weapons in a competitive security environment. The benefit to a nuclear-weapon state is 
reduced competition in an anarchic order. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the established watchdog, 
monitors NPT compliance. The IAEA conducts onsite visits to ensure that nuclear 
materials are not diverted to nefarious weapons programs. The organization identifies 
safeguard problems for correction and reports compliance failure to the United Nations 
Security Council. The enforcement mechanism is the combined influence of political, 
economic, and military powers. When prolonged failure to comply with the norms of the 
NPT raises questions about a country’s nuclear efforts, an alliance of nations reacts to 
bring the state back into compliance. The current efforts of the Joint Comprehensive 
Program of Action represent the initiative to bring Iran back into the fold while North 
Korea’s obstinacy has relegated it to the status of a hermit kingdom. In this way, 
international cooperation and multilateral alliances reinforce the nonproliferation norm. 
A consortium of nuclear nations established the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
in the wake of the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion by India.90 These nations responded 
to the potential of states to divert nuclear and dual-use technologies to nefarious nuclear 
activities. The result was a constantly growing list of technologies that are designated as 
restricted trade items that require special licensing to transfer them to another nation. The 
group has established a “trigger list” of nuclear materials, equipment, software, and dual-
use technologies subject to NSG restrictions.  
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The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) represents another attempt to 
limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction by restricting imports and exports of 
delivery-system technology. It represents a voluntary coalition of 34 nations seeking to 
limit the illicit acquisition of technologies on its designated trigger list of critical items 
used to produce missiles. Those who join the group and agree to its rules also receive 
privileged access to the items on the list. The coalition includes Russia and the United 
States but, conveniently, not China.91  
One of the critiques of the NPT and its associated efforts is that it creates a system 
of haves and have-nots. Nuclear-weapon states have agreed in Article 6 of the NPT to 
move toward nuclear disarmament. However, the slow progress to date breeds contempt 
by nonnuclear-weapon states. President Obama attempted to ease those concerns in his 
Prague speech and other policies—with little progress to show for his efforts. 
Participation in these regimes does not indicate accession to the nonproliferation 
norms. North Korea withdrew from the NPT before it fully acceded to its provisions, not 
to mention Iraq and Iran worked on nuclear weapons while proclaiming to be upstanding 
members. This thesis contends that the true value in these regimes resides in the ability to 
force states to reconsider nuclear intentions in light of international sanctions. A state’s 
level of participation in such regimes or perhaps a change in behavior toward them may 
serve as hedging indicators. 
G. CONCLUSION  
The previous sections have discussed the factors of threats, domestic factors, and 
international regimes to evaluate possible hedging nations. As depicted in Figure 3, the 
degree to which these factors interact influences whether a state will hedge. The space in 
which nuclear hedging occurs is approximate and bears qualitative review of past 
proliferation cases to determine how these factors interact. This thesis contends that the 
nexus of threats and favorable domestic conditions encourage proliferation, but the 
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layering of international regimes forces a nation to rethink its nuclear proliferation 
strategies. This nexus of factors creates an environment favorable to nuclear hedging (see 
Figure 3). On the left, security imperatives drive nations toward nuclear pursuit. On the 
right, internal supply and demand factors either enable or dissuade nuclear aspirations. 
The middle depicts the role of international regimes in a state contemplating a transition 
from nuclear restraint to nuclear pursuit. The following chapters analyze the cases of 
Japan and Pakistan to populate the construct. The intent is to identify commonalities and 
differences useful in application to Saudi Arabia.  
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III. PAKISTAN CASE STUDY: MORE THAN A HEDGE 
“The answer to an atom bomb can only be an atom bomb.”92 
 —Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan represents one of the best-documented cases of nuclear proliferation. 
Feroz Khan describes a country that started exploring nuclear weapons in 1971 and 
transitioned to nuclear pursuit three years later.93 It was in 1974 that the factors of an 
external threat, favorable domestic actors, and emerging nonproliferation regimes 
collided to push Pakistan toward seeking nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful 
nuclear pursuits. The Pakistan case study represents a nation pushed past its limits of 
restraint toward a decision to obtain the bomb. The critique from the standpoint of 
hedging is that Pakistan went from nuclear restraint to nuclear capability while feigning 
satisfaction with hedging to ensure foreign aid. If nuclear hedging is the gray space 
between restraint and rapidly pursuing the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, the 
Pakistani case illuminates the transition between developing the capacity in 1971 to 
pursuing production capability in 1974. Pakistan serves as an example of a state that 
chose to move hurriedly from nuclear restraint to nuclear proliferation without pursuing a 
reasonable hedging strategy. The decisions Pakistan made—in response to India, the role 
that alliances or the lack thereof played, and its industrial development—establishes a 
baseline proliferation case to contrast Japan, a true hedging case. The following sections 
use the analytical construct introduced in Chapter II to investigate the case of Pakistan. 
These sections discuss the history of the Pakistani nuclear program and evaluate it from 
the perspective of threats, domestic concerns, and the influence of regimes. 
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B. HISTORY 
To understand Pakistan is to appreciate the circumstances of its national 
emergence. The liberation of India from British rule gave birth to Pakistan in 1947. 
British Prime Minister Attlee realized that retaining India under British dominion was no 
longer feasible. Amidst growing religious violence in the region, he dispatched Lord 
Louis Mountbatten to oversee the eventual emancipation of India. As Viceroy, 
Mountbatten negotiated a settlement between fighting Hindu and Muslim factions by 
dividing the country. To demarcate the partition, Mountbatten employed Judge Cyril 
Radcliffe to redraw the maps that created Pakistan and India, a task that took him just 40 
days. The result was the birth of Pakistan, a nation that had geographic masses segregated 
by a jut of India one thousand miles wide. With the partition instituted, millions of 
Muslims migrated to Pakistan, and Hindus were displaced to India. This transition was as 
violent and bitter as the debates leading up to it. Accounts of “ghost trains” arriving at 
train stations with every occupant of the train butchered were common.94 The violence 
attributed to the mass migration of this era led to over a million deaths and left the 
collective psyche of both nations seared with an obsessive hatred toward one another.  
C. PAKISTAN’S SECURITY IMPERATIVE 
The Indo–Pakistani standoff dominates South-Asia’s security paradigm. Three 
wars before the Indo–Pakistani nuclear era cemented the acrimonious relationship 
embodied by Pakistan and India today. India and Pakistan fought over the Kashmir 
region in the Indo–Pakistani war of 1947. The war concluded under a United Nations 
(UN) resolution that left the territory of Kashmir divided. The second war was the Indo–
Pakistani war of 1965 that ended with a UN sanction and both countries subject to an 
arms embargo because of the hostilities.95 The Indo–Pakistani conflict of 1971 was the 
third war. In this conflict, Pakistan suffered a humiliating defeat to India, lost the territory 
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of East Pakistan, and saw 93,000 soldiers taken as prisoners of war.96 Pakistan 
recognized that it could not compete head-to-head with India in terms of aggregate power 
and needed a counterbalance to create military parity with India. 
In terms of latent power, Pakistan remained at a deficit with India. India was 
the sole beneficiary of the economic and military trappings of the British departure; India 
inherited a standing government while Pakistan had to establish a government and 
an economy from scratch. The relative disparity between the latent and military 
capabilities of India and Pakistan in 1971 is shown in Table 1. These relative proportions 
remain today. 
 Pakistani and Indian Latent and Military Strength Figures in 197197 Table 1.  
Latent Strength India Pakistan +/- Diff 
 Population 557,000,000 126,300,000 77.3% 
 GNP $49 Billion $16 Billion 67.3% 
    
Military Strength India Pakistan +/- Diff 
 Manpower 980,000 392,000 60% 
 Tanks 1450 870 40% 
 Aircraft 625 285 54.4% 
 
China’s nuclear test in 1964 spurred India to develop nuclear infrastructure as part 
of its national identity. Indian Admiral Krishan Nayyer stated, “The world has learned to 
live with U.S. power, Soviet power, even Chinese power, and it will have to learn to live 
with Indian power.”98 This statement captures the essence of Indian nationalism, and this 
aspect of its culture is alive and well in India’s nuclear program today.99 When the 
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Indians began reprocessing plutonium at the Trombay plant in 1964, this activity brought 
a debate about nuclear weapons to the forefront of Pakistani politics.100 Initially, 
President Ayub Khan thought that Pakistan could not afford to pursue nuclear weapons 
but could just buy them should the need arise.101 Only after Pakistan’s devastating loss in 
1971 did opinions lean toward acquiring a nuclear counterweight to the Indian threat.  
Pakistan’s history and precarious security situation from the very outset provided 
ample justification for pursuing nuclear weapons.  
D. ALLIANCES AS AN OFFSET TO INDEPENDENT ACTION  
Early in its nationhood, the Pakistanis sought to offset their diminished security 
position with India through balancing. Pakistan sought to develop alliances and 
agreements, predominantly with the United States, to counter India’s superior power. The 
first agreement was the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954. Soon after 
entering into the agreement, Pakistan suspected India of making side deals with the 
United States to undercut the alliance.102 The same year, Pakistan joined the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and in 1955, Pakistan became a member of the 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).103 These Cold-War security arrangements were 
part of America’s broader containment strategy aimed at countering Soviet expansionism. 
Pakistan’s location on Moscow’s southern flank provided key positions for U.S. military 
installations, bases to house U2 spy planes. Pakistan quickly became the “most aligned 
ally” among U.S. allies due to its geopolitical importance. However, the alliance between 
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Pakistan and the United States did not last. Three key events caused the alliance to 
deteriorate and established a trend of distrust that has defined the relationship. 
First, the United States and the United Kingdom’s provision of arms to India in 
the Sino–Indian War of 1962 as part of their efforts to curb communist expansion 
undermined the relationship with Pakistan.104 Pakistan felt that the United States should 
have consulted it before arming its neighboring enemy.105 At a minimum, Pakistan’s 
leaders wanted a guarantee that India would not turn the U.S.- and U.K.-supplied arms 
against them.106 The United States justified their actions as stopping the expansion of 
communism, which was the same basis for its alliance with Pakistan.107 This event 
represented an early sign that, when pushed, Pakistan’s security perceptions would 
always prevail over U.S. interests. 
Second, the U.S.–U.K. arms embargo imposed after the 1965 Indo–Pakistani 
conflict slighted the Pakistanis. Although the arms embargo applied equally to both sides 
of the conflict, the Pakistanis felt that the effects hurt them disproportionately. Their 
reasoning was that the arms embargo reinforced India’s advantage and left them even 
more vulnerable. The embargo forced Pakistan to look elsewhere for aid, and they found 
a new friend in China, which not only had experience living under arms embargoes but 
also was willing to provide broad assistance to help Pakistan deal with India. With its 
own interests at stake in South Asia, Beijing offered considerable advice. This included 
telling Prime Minister Bhutto to bide his time and avoid provoking India until Pakistan 
was stronger.108 The Chinese educated the Pakistanis in reverse-engineering foreign-
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defense technology, a trade they had mastered after their nation faced sanctions for 
nuclear weapons testing.109  
Third, Pakistan’s allies failed to come to its aid in the 1971 Indo–Pakistani 
conflict. When civil war broke out in East Pakistan, the United States tried to keep 
pressure off Pakistan by characterizing the uprising as an internal state matter.110 
However, Indira Gandhi pressured the international community for intervention, citing 
the genocidal actions of the Pakistani military and the flow of refugees into her country 
as a call for action. India threatened unilateral action, but it was not until a preemptive 
attack by the Pakistani Air force on six Indian airbases that India took action. Henry 
Kissinger had tried to exert pressure on India by requesting Chinese mobilization on the 
eastern front while the United States moved carrier groups to the Bay of Bengal.111 This 
move notoriously backfired by insulting both India and Pakistan with the implied but 
empty threat to intervene. In August 1971, the Indians signed the Indo–Soviet Treaty of 
Peace, Friendship, and Co-operation with Moscow, deepening Pakistan’s insecurity. 
Pakistan’s security needs remained unfulfilled by its alliances. In essence, 
SEATO was founded as a bulwark against communist expansionism when Pakistan truly 
needed an offset to India. Stung by the humiliating defeat and the loss of its eastern 
province, the Pakistanis felt their commitment to SEATO was unreciprocated in light of 
the U.S./U.K. arms embargo of 1965 and the lack of assistance in 1971. Pakistan 
formally left SEATO in 1973.112 The end of the alliance, however, did not end the 
relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The United States still provided 
much-needed economic and military aid and leveraged it over the next several years to 
                                                 
109 Jonah Blank, “Pakistan and China’s Almost Alliance,” Rand, accessed July 13, 2016, 
http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/10/pakistan-and-chinas-almost-alliance.html. 
110 U.S. Department of State, South Asia Crisis, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, 
ed. the Historical Office, vol. XI (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xi/45604.htm. 
111 “The South Asia Crisis and the Founding of Bangladesh, 1971,” U.S. Department of State, 
accessed September 6, 2016, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/south-asia. 
112 “Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954,” U.S. Department of State, accessed May 
14, 2016, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/seato. 
 41 
discourage the Pakistanis from pursuing nuclear weapons in response to Indian overtures. 
The defeat in 1971 instilled a national “never again” mentality among the Pakistanis.113 
Prime Minister Bhutto began to explore the nuclear-weapon option as a national 
guarantor of security in 1971 and followed up with a major push to acquire nuclear 
weapons in 1972 at Multan. Alliances failed to meet Pakistan’s security needs, driving 
Pakistan to seek the security afforded by nuclear weapons. 
E. DOMESTIC FACTORS 
A nation must bring its scientific, military, and political institutions into harmony 
to establish a credible nuclear weapons program. Politicians supplied the necessary 
economic and bureaucratic support, the scientific community provided the means to build 
a nuclear explosive package, and the military enabled its use. In Pakistan, the man 
responsible for this synchronization was Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. His rise to 
power and early experiences paint the background for Pakistan’s nuclear decision. Once 
Bhutto decided to establish a nuclear capability, his successors continued his work as a 
point of national resolve. This section explores the role Prime Minister Bhutto played in 
putting Pakistan on the nuclear path. 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto served as the foreign minister under President Ayub Khan. 
Bhutto was an astute politician known for having a political hedge strategy of “one foot 
inside the establishment and one outside” during Khan’s administration.114 Discussion of 
nuclear weapons first emerged in 1965 because of Indian nuclear reprocessing, and such 
debate led to the formation of pro- and anti-bomb lobbies.115 Bhutto and his foreign 
ministry were at the forefront of the bomb lobby. Their core arguments were as follows: 
1. The security landscape in South Asia changed with the Chinese nuclear 
test. 
2. Pakistan could not rely on ally support for security. 
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3. The window of opportunity was closing with the advent of the NPT. 
4. The disparity between Pakistani and Indian strength would be 
unbridgeable should India acquire a bomb. 
5. The establishment of a nuclear program would require growth in the 
scientific community and the downstream effect would enable Pakistan to 
become a technologically progressive nation.116 
Bhutto used these arguments to push for elements of a nuclear program 
piecemeal. Bhutto used surrogates, such as Munir Khan, to promote a nuclear weapons 
program that President Khan had rejected on cost factors.117 Bhutto’s consistent calls for 
action, to include his advocacy for war in 1965, drew the disdain of President Khan, and 
in 1966, Bhutto was asked to resign for medical reasons.118  
In the aftermath of the 1971 war, Bhutto rose to power as the Pakistani head of 
state under martial law. Once in power, his first order of business was the exploration of 
nuclear weapons. At the Multan conference, Bhutto announced he was replacing Ishrat 
Usmani with Munir Khan for director of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission 
(PAEC). This action had two effects. First, it supplanted Usmani, who had opposed 
Bhutto in his pursuit for a bomb.119 Second, it rewarded the loyalty of Munir Khan.120 In 
the contracting dispute, Bhutto had hoped to steer the deal toward a local construction 
company, but Usmani insisted that only a foreign company could maintain the quality.121 
Munir Khan, who was working at the International Atomic Energy Agency, promptly 
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resigned from his position and accepted the position of director of the PAEC. This 
conference shifted favor to the pro-bomb community, and exploration ensued.  
The military was initially apathetic about nuclear weapons; their interests lay in 
the modernization and equipping of their respective services. It was not until a routine 
Pakistani interagency brief to the Army’s General Headquarters by PAEC Director 
Usmani that the Army considered the idea of nuclear weapons. In 1967, Usmani 
presented a nuclear fuel-cycle brief that clearly went over the heads of the military 
officers in the room until he highlighted the point at which a nuclear weapons program 
starts.122 This was the “eureka” moment for the Pakistani military’s interest in nuclear 
weapons. As arms embargoes and sanctions continued to limit the ability to modernize 
and equip its forces, the military’s impetus for weapons only increased.  
For Bhutto to capitalize on his successes of providing purpose to the scientific 
community and bringing the military aboard, he needed to align the government with his 
policy. Aligning the government was instrumental in securing funding, resources, and 
labor. Once he received research plans for enriching uranium and producing plutonium, 
President Bhutto made the PAEC a direct-reporting entity and directed the finance 
minister to supply all the funds necessary.123  
History credits Prime Minister Bhutto as the father of the Pakistani bomb. He was 
arguably the right man at the right place, at the right time, and with the right idea when 
threats and domestic factors converged. The arguments of his pro-bomb lobby resonated 
among a population reeling from defeat. Subsequent government validation of his 
proposed nuclear program allowed a continuous national focus toward security 
independence.  
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1. Technological Barriers and National Will 
In 1971, Pakistan was in tatters, its economy dependent on foreign aid. The odds 
that it could pull together the scientific expertise and the finances to master the nuclear 
fuel-cycle seemed like a longshot. Yet Pakistan mobilized patriotism to bring back the 
necessary scientists and further mobilized Islamic identity among Middle Eastern nations, 
such as Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, to help finance the effort.124 This section examines 
Pakistan’s nuclear development in terms of personnel, material, infrastructure, and 
delivery development. 
In the 1950s, Pakistan jump-started its energy program through the Atoms for 
Peace program, and energy independence became a realizable dream. Nazhir Ahmad led 
a peaceful yet stumbling program that lacked any inkling of military application or 
motivation and did not fulfill a military-political necessity.125 Ishrat Usmani took the 
reins in 1960 and envisioned making Pakistani nuclear energy a reality. During this time, 
Pakistan experienced substantial economic growth, and Usmani rallied political support 
from Zulfiqar Bhutto, then foreign minister, and Abdus Salam to garner the necessary 
intergovernmental support for a nuclear power program.126 During this early period, 
Pakistan’s nuclear program lacked any weapons application, focusing solely on energy 
development. Usmani developed relationships among his organization and the academic 
and political bases. This process started to build Pakistani’s nuclear intellectual capacity 
should a change of course occur in the future. 
In Prime Minister Bhutto’s authorization for the PAEC to advance toward nuclear 
fuel-cycle development, he charged the program with a nationalistic, anti-Indian 
objective. He brought back scientists from abroad to participate in the Pakistani endeavor 
for less pay by appealing to their patriotism. Two of the more prominent scientists were 
Munir Khan and Abdul Qadeer “A. Q.” Khan. Pakistan did not undertake this endeavor 
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with an empty cupboard in terms of nuclear scientists; Usmani’s work built a cadre of 
multi-disciplined scientists for the program to advance.  
The next question of the proliferation puzzle was how to bring more reactors into 
Pakistan to build the nuclear infrastructure. The advent of the NPT and the Indian nuclear 
test of 1974 put Pakistan’s motivations into question. Pakistan’s approach was to accept 
foreign technology with IAEA safeguards but seek a clause to reproduce or reverse-
engineer domestically any equipment or infrastructure provided. This allowed for a 
parallel development track that facilitated imports of foreign technology while bypassing 
the IAEA’s nuclear safeguards. Soon thereafter, countries grew uncomfortable, and deals 
fell through. The Canadians refused to provide support for the Karachi Nuclear Power 
Plant (KANUPP)’s reactor without Pakistan agreeing to stringent safeguards.127 
Chinese assistance was paramount to Pakistan’s nuclear success. As a non-
signatory to the NPT, the Pakistanis found it difficult to acquire the items they needed to 
succeed. Chinese assistance enabled the Pakistani nuclear program to leapfrog difficult 
technological barriers. The Chinese provided over the course of Pakistan’s nuclear 
endeavor the plans to the CHIC-4 nuclear explosive package, 50 kilograms of highly 
enriched uranium, and 15 tons of UF6.128 In addition, the Chinese, who were living under 
their own set of sanctions since their test in 1964, offered to help reverse-engineer 
Western technologies to which they had not had access. The Chinese went as far as 
dispatching a team to KANUPP to begin the reverse-engineering process.129  
As the Pakistanis were debating nuclear exploration, a young Pakistani scientist 
named A. Q. Khan was working with centrifuges at the Uranium Enrichment Consortium 
(URENCO) in the Netherlands. Stunned by the bitter defeat in 1971, Khan felt obliged to 
offer his services to his homeland. Khan wrote to Prime Minister Bhutto asking to assist 
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in the Pakistani nuclear program. His placement and access in URENCO gave him 
routine contact with up-and-coming nuclear designs such as the German G-1 and G-2 
centrifuges.130 As discussed in Chapter II, centrifuges are a means to enrich uranium 
from U238 to U235. Khan offered access not only to centrifuge technology but also to the 
suppliers for these machines. He set up a network that exploited differences in import and 
export laws. These actions allowed Pakistan access to materials, such as high-strength 
aluminum, and parts required for advanced centrifuges.131 In the course of his work at 
URENCO, Khan established relationships with primary vendors, which allowed access 
and sales not available to the public. His later exploitation of this acquisition network for 
profit is a well-known story, outside the scope of this thesis.  
The Pakistanis worked on simultaneous delivery systems. When they hit a 
technological barrier for missiles, they sought collaborative exchanges. For example, 
when North Korea lacked enough cash, the Pakistanis bought No-Dong missiles from 
them.132 Collaboration with the Chinese continued, and the Pakistanis sought technology 
transfers, not the articles themselves.133 These actions guaranteed Pakistan a sustainable 
arms program. The Pakistanis applied this self sufficiency–based approach to most of the 
systems they purchased. In one specific case, the United States inadvertently helped the 
Pakistanis with missile technology. President Clinton ordered several Tomahawk missiles 
launched at terrorist camps in the U.S. attack on Afghanistan. As these missiles traveled 
over Baluchistan, some failed to reach their target and crashed.134 The Pakistanis 
recovered and reverse-engineered a missile into what became their Babur cruise missile 
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in service today.135 Data gleaned from the Tomahawk missile also contributed to the 
Chinese DH-10 cruise missile.136 
The Pakistanis proved that where there is a will, there is a way. They were able to 
take a relatively impoverished and technically challenged nation and produce a credible 
nuclear capability. Pakistan’s nuclear credibility and the U.S. desire for access to 
Afghanistan created a situation in which nuclear activities were acceptable, but an open 
nuclear weapons program was not. Analyzing the Pakistani proliferation case has caused 
groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group to revise their practices in looking for nuclear 
deviance in the import/export communities.  
The technological indicators of proliferation in this case study are the close 
collaboration with another nuclear state in nuclear matters, the networked approach to 
acquisition, the desire for non-safeguarded nuclear facilities, and concurrent delivery 
system development. 
2. Economic Factors   
Pakistan’s regard for the economic impact of a nuclear program held different 
weights during the various phases of nuclear deliberation. For the Ayub Khan 
government, economic reform was the centerpiece, and nuclear weapons were an 
extravagance that ran counter to his government’s efforts. Zulfiqar Bhutto’s 
administration adopted a nuclear imperative that spared no expense in its quest for the 
bomb. Zia’s administration applied a combined approach that obfuscated nuclear 
intentions to keep international aid flowing. Once Bhutto made the decision, Pakistan’s 
security superseded its economic concerns. 
Ayub Khan argued that Pakistan could not afford such programs. Bhutto, Khan’s 
foreign minister, argued that the country’s security could not afford nuclear restraint if it 
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could not prevent Indian “nuclear blackmail.”137 Bhutto recognized that the 
modernization gained through the experience would have distributive effects on the 
economy.138 The military necessity of a nuclear program was not established, so the 1965 
war concluded Ayub Khan’s debate over nuclear weapons.   
Bhutto placed Pakistan’s security at the forefront with his nuclear decision in the 
aftermath of the 1971 humiliation. When Prime Minister Bhutto directed the finance 
minister to spare no expense, he solicited fiscal support abroad himself. He lobbied Saudi 
Arabia, Libya, China, Iran, and Turkey for assistance.139 He received considerable 
support from the Libyans, ranging from hundreds of millions of dollars to yellow cake.140 
Saudi Arabia’s considerable and enduring financial support is rumored to come with the 
strings of future Pakistani nuclear support to the Kingdom should the need ever arise.141 
This fuels the common speculation that the Saudis would press Pakistan for support 
should they feel pressure from Iran. President Zia’s execution of Bhutto turned these 
somewhat stalwart allies against him, but the United States filled the financial disparity 
left by the vacuum. When the U.S. support withered and sanctions were imposed, Saudi 
Arabia provided sustaining support in the form of energy concessions.142 
In 1980, President Zia rebranded the Pakistani nuclear program in light of a deal 
cut with President Reagan. In exchange for access to Afghanistan, the United States 
offered significant financial aid. One of the conditions of the deal was Pakistan’s 
assurance of a peaceful nuclear program. As a result, President Zia issued a directive to 
his nuclear establishment: halt production of highly enriched uranium (HEU), cease 
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machining of HEU into weapon geometries, forgo hot testing, and stop transferring actual 
or intellectual nuclear technologies to other states.143 As shown in Figure 4, the ebb and 
flow of U.S. funds and increased funding to Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan shored up the deficit left by Bhutto’s death. 
 
Figure 4.  History of U.S. Fiscal Obligations to Pakistan through 2011, 
in Millions of U.S. Dollars144 
Pakistani leaders learned to practice nuanced diplomacy that deemphasized their 
nuclear program to secure financial aid whenever available. When the Soviets withdrew 
from Afghanistan and the strategic partnership with the United States waned, the 
Pakistanis chose their nuclear program over millions in economic aid. In 1990, President 
George H.W. Bush acknowledged Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program by refusing to 
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certify its nonexistence. Bush’s refusal triggered the provisions of the Pressler 
Amendment of 1986, cutting off most economic and military aid to Pakistan.145 In 1998, 
the threat from India’s nuclear test outweighed the economic benefits of nonproliferation 
for Pakistan, triggering a new round of sanctions under the Glenn Amendment.146 
Although economics plays a factor in Pakistani decision-making, economics ultimately 
yields to security measures.  
F. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
International nuclear regimes, such as the NPT and its watchdog the NSG, 
fostered ingenuity in Pakistan’s diplomacy and acquisition approach. Pakistan held three 
differing positions on these regimes. First, emerging regimes were a means to improving 
its security position vis-à-vis India’s. Second, regimes were an impediment to its nuclear 
objectives once the decision to go nuclear took place. Third, Pakistan viewed these 
regimes as Western bigotry that created a system of nuclear haves and have-nots. A side 
effect of these various regimes was that they created conditions to drive the Pakistanis 
into secrecy and improvisation. This section explores how the Pakistanis factored these 
international regimes into national decision-making and their pursuit for nuclear security.  
Pakistan’s zero-sum security view of India created an intractable position toward 
accession to restrictive nuclear regimes. Pakistan’s acceptance of the NPT is contingent 
on India doing the same. Over the years, Pakistan has proposed joint attempts to allay 
nuclear fears, such as an Indo–Pakistan declaration rejecting acquisition or production of 
nuclear weapons, a South-Asian nuclear weapon–free zone, and joint acceptance of 
IAEA safeguards.147 Pakistan offered these measures with the calculation that India 
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would neither accept the terms nor give up security in the face of menacing China. This 
led to the nuclear status quo in South Asia today. 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s 1964 pro-bomb lobby was the first time Pakistan viewed the 
emerging NPT as a potential barrier to its nuclear options.148 Bhutto contended that if the 
Khan government did not act hastily to secure nuclear expertise, the impending NPT 
restrictions would impede future consideration of nuclear weapons. Bhutto’s attempt to 
use the NPT as an impetus for action failed, and he did not get to implement his nuclear 
ambitions until 1971.  
In 1974, India’s test sparked the creation of the London Suppliers Group, later, 
the NSG, to restrict nuclear technology further. The establishment of restrictive regimes 
had adverse effects on Pakistan; they forced improvisation and innovation in both the 
procurement and scientific communities. In the procurement community, the NSG 
restrictions forced buyers to find and exploit seams in import and export laws of 
European nations such as Switzerland.149 When such exploitation failed, the Pakistanis 
employed illegal methods, such as industrial espionage and unscrupulous suppliers like 
the Tinner family, to supply precision centrifuge parts.150 Within the scientific 
community, sanctions and restrictions pushed the Pakistanis to abandon the pursuit of 
plutonium when its plutonium reprocessing deal with France fell though at the behest of 
U.S. pressure.151 The United States hoped to deny fissile material production to the 
Pakistanis by pressuring Western suppliers, but the Pakistani scientific community turned 
its focus on mastering uranium enrichment.  
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The United States made various attempts to block Pakistan’s pursuit of weapons; 
it offered incentives, such as military and economic aid, and threatened sanctions for 
noncompliance. The Glenn, Symington, and Pressler Amendments associated economic 
costs with continued proliferation, but “waivers-for favors” during the Cold War 
undermined the effects.152 Feroz Khan credits U.S. efforts for instilling “a norm of norm-
defiance” in the Pakistanis.153 The U.S. effort to raise the cost of nuclear weapons 
beyond Pakistan’s threshold hardened Pakistani resolve to produce nuclear weapons. An 
unintended consequence was Pakistan’s characterization of a country standing up to the 
West, thereby captivating the Muslim community.154 
The Pakistanis managed a national policy of ambivalence toward international 
regimes. On the one hand, if India had acceded to the NPT, Pakistan would have 
followed suit. On the other hand, Pakistan continued to work around these regimes to 
secure the materials necessary to build a nuclear capability. The United States offered 
rewards and punishments for Pakistan’s nuclear program, but Pakistan’s need for security 
outweighed both. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons represents a case in which international 
regimes and foreign incentives were not strong enough factors to dissuade an eager 
government faced with an existential threat. The threat of a nuclear India propelled the 
military, scientific communities, and politicians to unite in their efforts. Pakistan’s 
national unity led to a comprehensive approach to secure nuclear weapons. This section 
reviews how these factors created an environment for proliferation over hedging.  
Pakistan was a nation born out of rivalry with India. The 1947, 1965, and 1971 
Indo–Pakistani wars cemented this rivalry into a national heritage. Because of these wars, 
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the Kashmir region continues to provide a source of border tension. The almost three-to-
one latent and military advantage held by India over Pakistan compounds these tensions. 
The manner in which Pakistan lost the 1971 war, which resulted in the loss of half its 
country to a dominant Indian force, led to the belief that Pakistan needed to offset India’s 
conventional forces.  
Conventional war alone did not heighten Pakistan’s sense of threat. India’s foray 
into nuclear reprocessing in 1965 and its subsequent peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 
introduced nuclear concerns into the competition. The Indian reprocessing center at 
Trombay established the credibility of an Indian nuclear program that made some in the 
Pakistani government uneasy. 
The disparity in alliances disappointed Pakistan greatly. The Pakistanis had built 
their strategy of aligning with superpowers, such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom, upon faulty expectations. The Western powers sought to counterbalance Soviet 
influence rather than back Pakistan in its skirmishes with India. This misalignment 
ultimately provoked security self-determination in the Pakistanis. The left portion of 
Figure 5 depicts the culmination of individual threat factors that pushed Pakistan beyond 
nuclear hedging into pursuit. 
The military, political, and scientific communities achieved unity concerning 
nuclear weapons in 1972. After Bhutto’s rise to power in 1971 under martial law, he 
quickly consolidated power by appointing General Zia-ul-Haq as the Chief of Army Staff 
and Munir Khan as the head of the PAEC. With these three institutions synchronized, 
nuclear-weapon exploration and the subsequent pursuit began. 
Pakistan lacked the technical capability in manufacturing and access to nuclear 
technologies. However, it had trained professionals in the PAEC, thanks to Usmani’s 
efforts. The nationalist pursuit instilled an “improvise and overcome” mentality in all 
involved. This applied to the scientific fields as well as the purchasing agents abroad 
seeking to secure the necessary materials. One cannot overlook the role foreign help 
played throughout this process; the Chinese supply of UF6, weapons designs, and HEU 
gave a significant boost to the program. 
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Figure 5.  Factors Contributing to Pakistani Nuclear Proliferation 
The Pakistani economy took a backseat to the pursuit of nuclear weapons once 
Bhutto assumed power. Bhutto provided financial offsets through foreign investment in 
the Pakistani nuclear program. Zia-ul-Haq offset expenses with U.S. funds received 
during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Whereas Bhutto was brash in his signaling and 
pursuit of nuclear weapons, Zia offered a more discreet approach to avoid inflaming U.S. 
sensitivities. Figure 5 shows the culmination of supply and factors on the right side that 
converged to create a nuclear capability.  
The Pakistanis attempted to leverage international regimes to maximize their 
security position. It was clear that India would not sign the NPT before Pakistan and vice 
versa. Once in pursuit of weapons, Pakistan viewed international regimes as hurdles to its 
security goals. U.S. diplomacy tried to influence the Pakistanis but was unable to shift 
Pakistani intent. An attitude of defiance toward the West and ambivalence toward nuclear 
regimes took hold. As shown in Figure 5, international regimes present a decision space 
to consider the consequences of nuclear pursuit. In the case of Pakistan, the security 
gained outweighed the consequences of the international regimes.  
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The Pakistani case demonstrates what a determined country can accomplish when 
its security imperatives are in line with a consistent and coherent strategy. Hedging was 
not enough. Pakistan’s inability to compete with India militarily or to count on Western 
alliances drove it to seek security self-sufficiency through nuclear weapons. International 
regimes unsuccessfully addressed Pakistan’s security requirements and were 
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IV. JAPAN CASE STUDY: THE CONSUMMATE HEDGE 
“It is in the interest of the United States, so long as it does not wish to see 
Japan withdraw from the NPT and develop its own nuclear deterrent, to 
maintain its alliance with Japan and continue to provide a nuclear 
umbrella.”155 
 —Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Former Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa’s statement highlights the basic 
premise of Japan’s nuclear hedge: Japan receives U.S. protection in exchange for its 
continued nuclear restraint and role as a standard bearer for nonproliferation norms. 
Japan’s advanced nuclear fuel cycle and technological knowledge establish the credibility 
of its nuclear hedge. Once again, this proliferation case focuses on the intersection of 
threat, domestic factors, and external regimes. Japan’s threats arise from North Korea, a 
nuclear-armed adversary, and China, a nuclear-armed competitor. It balances these 
threats with agreements of mutual defense from the United States and its extended 
nuclear umbrella.  
The Japanese public’s adverse reaction to nuclear-weapon ownership holds the 
government back from nuclear acquisition. The Japanese constitution reflects the public’s 
sentiment through its regulation of defense forces. However, this stance is changing. 
Where it was once heresy to speak of a deployable military in Japan, it is now a reality. 
Where it once was politically unacceptable to speak of Japanese nuclear weapons in the 
Diet, the discussion is now taking place.156 Complicating the matter even further is 
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Japan’s leadership in global nonproliferation efforts. Japan has been seen globally as the 
paragon of nonproliferation norms. By continually revisiting the nuclear armament 
discussion, Japan reaffirms its security commitment with the United States, leveraging its 
abilities to go nuclear and its stature in the nonproliferation community.  
This chapter investigates Japan’s nuclear hedge using the analytic construct from 
Chapter II. The first section examines Japan’s post–World War II nuclear history. The 
second section analyzes Japan’s threat from China and North Korea and its subsequent 
strategies to offset through alliance. The next section surveys domestic concerns, 
specifically government policy and the consistent debate over nuclear weapons while also 
examining technological and economic factors associated with nuclear concerns. The 
fourth section examines the role of nonproliferation regimes in the national nuclear 
calculus. This chapter concludes by examining Japan as a paragon of nuclear hedging 
and, in contrast to Pakistan, a clear case of nuclear acquisition to elucidate factors that 
drive nuclear hedging. 
B. HISTORY 
Japan’s history provides evidence of an interest in nuclear weapons. During 
World War II, Japan briefly pursued nuclear weapons to no avail; the country ultimately 
found that the lack of resources restricted pursuit.157 The unconditional surrender of 
Japan in the wake of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and the subsequent U.S.-led 
administration suppressed the discussion of Japanese nuclear weapons for the next few 
decades. In the reestablishment of the Japanese government in 1947, its constitution 
forbade the right to declare war and use force to solve international disputes.158  
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Following World War II, the United States recognized Japan’s strategic 
importance as both a counter to communist aggression and a means of extended presence 
in the Pacific. Specifically, a Japanese presence counterbalanced rising communism in 
China, served as a logistical staging base for the Korean War, and became a power 
projection platform for the Vietnam conflict. When China emerged as a nuclear nation in 
1964, the United States extended its umbrella of nuclear deterrence over Japan. At the 
end of the Cold War when the United States began talks with Russia to limit the strategic 
arms, Japan questioned the saliency of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and debated the merits 
of its own nuclear program. Once again, the U.S. promise of protection quelled Japanese 
concerns.  
In 2016, nuclear neighbors North Korea and China pose challenges to Japanese 
security that have reignited old debates over the credibility of the nuclear umbrella and 
the efficacy of nuclear restraint. The past 60 years resembles a rollercoaster of spiked 
Japanese security concerns and steady security reassurances from the United States that 
have maintained the nuclear status quo. A pattern of events has elevated Japanese 
concerns repeatedly, but U.S. security assurances have brought the Japanese back to the 
accepted norm of extended nuclear deterrence. A sequence of key events that highlights 
this cycle was assembled over the course of this research (see Figure 6). The next section 
analyzes the threats posed by China and North Korea as well as the Japanese response.  
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Figure 6.  Ebb and Flow of Japanese Nuclear Concern 
C. ANALYZING JAPAN’S EVOLVING SECURITY THREATS 
Japan’s security environment is increasingly complex. The security challenges 
revolve around two consistent threats: China and North Korea. Brutal Japanese 
occupation during World War II engendered cultural antipathy toward Japan that still 
exists in its rivals today. Japan faces a boisterous, nuclear North Korea that remains 
undeterred by international sanctions. Japan also has to contend with China, a rising 
economic behemoth, which is vigorously asserting itself throughout the region. This 
section examines these two primary sources of threat to Japan. 
China enjoys a distinct military and economic advantage over Japan. While Japan 




at $145.8 billion.159 Table 2 depicts Japan deficit in comparison to China’s latent and 
military strength—even before introducing nuclear weapons. Japan is not as large 
geographically as China, so it does not require the force that China deems necessary to 
maintain an adequate defense. Whereas China possesses strategic rocket forces and other 
offensive capabilities, Japan invests heavily in defensive capabilities such as ballistic 
missile defense and next generation aircraft. Over the past five years, both nations have 
gradually modernized their militaries, and this trend looks to continue.  
 Chinese and Japanese Latent and Military Strength in 2016160 Table 2.  
Latent Strength China Japan +/- Diff 
 Population 1,374,626,494 126,919,659 90.77% 
 GDP $10.4 Trillion $4.6 Trillion 65.77% 
    
Military Strength China Japan +/- Diff 
 Manpower 2,843,000 303,250 89.43% 
 Tanks 6540 688 89.48% 
 Aircraft 2306 557 75.85% 
 Surface Combatant   
 Ships 
74 47 36.49% 
 Submarines 61 18 70.5% 
 
China’s modernization of its nuclear forces, in conjunction with heavy investment 
in anti-access and area denial capabilities (A2AD), challenges Japanese defensive plans 
by offsetting the competitive advantage of the United States. China’s Dongfeng-41 
nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) upgrade program is expected to extend 
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missile ranges to 14,000 kilometers.161 This new generation of mobile missiles ensures  
survivability of China’s retaliatory capabilities. Despite China’s no-first-use reassurances, 
these upgrades—coupled with the advent of the DF-21 family of medium range ballistic 
missiles designed to target aircraft carriers—paint a troubling picture for security in the 
region.162 Chinese modernization, while touted as defensive in nature, provides 
challenges to the regional status quo.  
China’s recent aggression in the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea remains 
the foremost point of contention between the two nations. Much like the case with the 
Spratly and Paracel Islands of the South China Sea, China is challenging Japan’s 
ownership of the Senkaku islands by asserting its historical ownership. Despite Japan’s 
de facto ownership since 1895, China claims that Japan’s nationalization of the Islands is 
invalid.163 Japan routinely conducts air and sea patrols to discourage continuous Chinese 
excursions within 60 miles of the islands. The 2014 meeting between Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping offered a brief respite to tensions, 
but recent challenges to the Senkaku Islands following The Hague’s ruling in favor of the 
Philippines in the South China Sea continues to threaten East-Asian security. 164 
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Across the Sea of Japan resides Japan’s other threat, nuclear North Korea.  North 
Korea’s defiance of international norms, political instability, and past actions raise 
concerns for the Japanese. North Korea’s march to nuclear weapons has exacerbated 
fears and reinvigorated debate over the role of the Japanese military and its potential  
ownership of a nuclear deterrent. North Korea began testing the Nodong missile in 1993 
by conducting test flights in the Sea of Japan.165 Japan’s threat assessment concluded that 
the Nodong was capable of striking downtown Tokyo with a 700–1200 kg payload within 
seven to ten minutes after launch.166 North Korea did not stop at the Nodong but 
continued development of larger longer-range weapons such as the Taepodong and 
Musadan families of missiles.167 In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe immediately condemned the test as a “serious threat 
to the security of Japan and South Korea, and neighboring countries.”168 President 
George W. Bush immediately reassured Abe that the United States would “meet the full 
range of [its] deterrent and security commitments.”169 In light of North Korean 
advancements and subsequent tests, President Obama has echoed the same commitments.  
North Korea’s conventional force, although formidable in size, is primarily 
oriented for a ground-based war with South Korea. The numbers in Table 3 indicate that 
North Korea lacks the ability to project its forces abroad. Today, North Korea’s strategic 
missile forces and their nuclear capabilities are the principal threat to Japan. 
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 North Korean and Japanese Latent and Military Strength in 2016170 Table 3.  
Latent Strength North Korea Japan +/- Diff 
 Population 24,983,205 126,919,659 -80.32% 
 GDP ~$40 Billion $4.6 Trillion -99.13% 
    
Military Strength North Korea Japan +/- Diff 
 Manpower 1,190,000 303,250 74.52% 
 Tanks 4060 688 83.05% 
 Aircraft 545 557 -2.15% 
 
Japanese security finds challenges in a modernizing China that not only competes 
economically with Japan but also seeks to assert itself militarily in contested areas such 
as the Senkaku Islands. The undeterred nuclear march of Kim Jung-un’s North Korea 
continues to cast a shadow over Japan as Japanese leaders contemplate how to confront 
the North Korean threat. The next section explores the Japanese approach of allying with 
the United States to offset its security threats.  
D. ALLIANCES AS AN OFFSET TO NUCLEAR ACQUISITION 
The United States forged an enduring alliance with post–World War II Japan. The 
United States, under the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP), led a three-
phase reconstruction effort that punished war criminals, rebuilt the economy, and 
concluded with a lasting peace treaty.171 In the first phase, Japan’s constitutional revision 
occurred with the initial draft written by the Japanese and the final version by the senior 
U.S. officers of SCAP. The final draft forbade the Japanese from maintaining a military 
and left them dependent on the United States for protection.  
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The Japanese people resumed governance in 1947, and in 1951, the Treaty of 
Peace fully restored Japanese sovereignty. At the same time, Japan signed the Treaty of 
Mutual Cooperation and Security, an agreement between it and the United States. Similar 
to the NATO Charter, Article V of the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty commits 
the United States to defending Japan.172 As these treaties took effect, they allowed Japan 
to adopt the Yoshida doctrine. The Yoshida doctrine provided a framework of Japanese 
foreign policy predicated on continued reliance on the United States for defense, which 
strengthened foreign relations to enable domestic economic reconstruction and helped 
Japan remain globally inconspicuous.173 As fighting in Korea commenced, U.S. forces 
were unavailable for Japanese security. At the behest of the United States, a Japanese 
force was established. This force evolved into the current Japanese Self Defense Force 
(SDF) in existence today.  
Japan focused primarily on economic reconstruction until the Chinese tested a 
nuclear weapon. This test spurred a series of studies on the feasibility of Japanese nuclear 
armament. The first was called the 1968/70 Internal Report.174 After the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Japan initiated another study regarding nuclear armament. The third study, in 
1995, became known as the Japanese Defense Agency Report.175 This report was set 
against growing Japanese concern that an absence of Soviet threat and improving U.S–
Sino relations would compromise U.S. protection for Japan. Inflaming these post–Cold 
War concerns with Russia, the Chinese began modernizing their nuclear arsenal while the 
United States and Russia were downsizing nuclear missile forces. In all cases, the studies 
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found that continued reliance on extended nuclear deterrence of the United States was in 
Japan’s best interest. 
The advent of Chinese military modernization and North Korean nuclear and 
ballistic missile testing sparked increased defense spending in Japan. Talk of nuclear 
acquisition in lieu of U.S. security reliance persists in the wake of recent North Korean 
overtures, but Japan keeps returning to the value of extended deterrence and accepts 
periodic reaffirmed commitments from the United States. It is clear that when faced by a 
bifurcated threat in North Korea and rising Chinese assertiveness, the Japanese conclude 
that it is in their best interest to bandwagon with the United States. 
E. DOMESTIC FACTORS 
Contemplation of nuclear weapons is a contentious issue in Japan; mere talk of 
nuclear armament has caused political cabinets to fall. It is often said that in the wake of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the subsequent testing of the U.S. hydrogen bomb, Japan 
has developed a “nuclear allergy,” that makes sheer mention of nuclear weapon pursuits 
politically untenable and emotional.176 However, as the Chinese and North Korean 
threats evolve, so does increased acceptance of nuclear rhetoric. Nascent discussions 
regarding nuclear weapons—starting as early as Prime Minister Kishi’s 1957 assertion 
that nuclear weapons may not violate Japan’s constitution—continue today.177 This 
section explores the deliberations and studies that have led to Japan’s present-day 
hedging strategy. 
In 1964, the Chinese nuclear test provoked Prime Minister Sato’s administration 
to contemplate nuclear pursuit.178 In the interim, Sato secured a pledge from Lyndon 
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Johnson assuring the mutual defense treaty included extension of nuclear deterrence.179 
In 1967, in an effort to bring the discussion of nuclear weapons before the Diet, Prime 
Minister Sato delivered his three non-nuclear principles speech. He introduced his three 
non-nuclear principles of not manufacturing, possessing, or permitting introduction of 
nuclear weapons to Japan. Although he hoped to spark a debate over Japan’s armament, 
the Japanese government adopted his principles as a strategy. Fearing that the last 
principle would restrict U.S. extended deterrence, Sato further introduced the four nuclear 
pillars in 1968.180 These pillars comprise the following: 
1. Promotion of Peaceful Nuclear Energy 
2. Global Disarmament 
3. Reliance on the U.S. for Deterrence 
4. Continued Support for the 3 Non-Nuclear Principles.181 
Unsatisfied with the promise of extended deterrence alone, Sato commissioned a 
study to determine the feasibility of a Japanese nuclear deterrent. This study is known as 
the “Basic Study on Japan’s Nuclear Policy” or the 1968/70 Report. The report was split 
into two efforts: the first report, completed in 1968, focused on the technical, financial, 
and organizational aspects of a nuclear weapons program, and the second half, the 1970 
portion, analyzed the pros and cons through strategic, political, and diplomatic aspects.182  
The 1968 portion of the report found that while nuclear armament was possible, it 
was not feasible due to cost, constraint, and complexity. The report focused on the 
internal matters relating to nuclear buildup. Specifically, the report cited public 
disapproval; IAEA restrictions regarding reprocessing of nuclear material; resource 
constraints, both material and fiscal; and difficulty developing complementary 
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technology, such as missile guidance, required to enable a deterrent as roadblocks to 
nuclear pursuit.183  
The 1970 report focused on the “up and out” aspects relating to nuclear pursuit. It 
examined the Chinese threat, the strategic implications of nuclear acquisition, and the 
political and diplomatic challenges such an endeavor presents.184 The findings concluded 
that the U.S. nuclear deterrent was an effective counter against China. The analysis also 
found that nuclear possession might increase the risk of a first strike. Considering Japan’s 
population density, of which 50 percent of the population lived on 20 percent of the land, 
a nuclear exchange would prove disastrous to Japan. Nuclear pursuit also ran the risk of 
leaving Japan isolated by provoking the Soviet Union and China while causing 
irreparable damage to its alliance with the United States.185 The report held the standard 
that if nuclear pursuit could guarantee Japanese security, it was worth the endeavor. The 
conclusion of the study made it crystal clear that a Japanese nuclear program could not 
guarantee Japanese security. The 1968/1970 reports valued continued reliance on U.S. 
extended deterrence. Concurrent internal foreign policy in 1969 stated that Japan should 
maintain a capability to develop weapons while simultaneously advocating 
nonproliferation.186 It was in this era that the Japanese nuclear hedge was born. 
Japan took a turn toward nonproliferation, but it did not put the nuclear pursuit 
discussion to rest. A report conducted by the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) in 1970 
found that nuclear weapons could be produced in less than five years at a cost of 200 
billion yen.187 The JDA’s 1995 “ Report on the Problems of the Proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction” revisited the 1970 assessment to come to the same conclusion that 
nuclear pursuit was possible, but nuclear abstention was in Japan’s interest from both 
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fiscal and security perspectives.188 When leaked, this assessment secured a pledge of 
extended deterrence from United States President Clinton.189 The academic rigor behind 
these reports and the strategic leaking of them to the public served Japan well in securing 
continual security assurances from the United States. 
Presently, Prime Minister’s Abe’s cabinet continues to debate nuclear pursuit by 
referencing the constitutionality of nuclear weapons in hypothetical situations.190 Taking 
into consideration the recent upgrade of the Japanese Defense Agency to the Ministry of 
Defense in 2007 and the 2015 change in article IX of the Japanese constitution that 
allows deployment of the armed forces abroad for collective defense, the political climate 
paints a situation in which nuclear pursuit is open for discussion once again.191 These 
discussions are not without political cost, as the revision of Article IX of the Japanese 
constitution resulted in physical altercations on the Diet floor. 
Complicating Japan’s nuclear hedge is the fact that the population is largely anti-
nuclear. Sato’s approach to the nuclear debate to desensitize the nuclear issue backfired 
when he presented it to the Diet in 1967. In 1999, Deputy Vice Minister of Defense 
Shingo Nishimura advocated the departure from nuclear restraint, which sparked protests 
resulting in his resignation.192 During a college lecture in 2003, Shinzo Abe angered the 
student population by reasserting the constitutionality of nuclear weapons. After the 
North Korean test in 2006, a poll showed that 80 percent of the surveyed population 
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opposed an independent Japanese nuclear arsenal.193 Despite public dismay toward his 
position, Abe continues to reassert the legality of nuclear weapons as the current prime 
minister.194 
While images of World War II reinforce the population’s pacifism, the recent 
Article IX debate demonstrates political will to depart from popular support on issues of 
security. Within all the bluster of nuclear discussion, the key problems of susceptibility to 
first strike, the resulting deleterious diplomatic effects, increased regional volatility, and 
the damage to the U.S. alliance have yet to be adequately addressed. The continual 
nuclear discussion reinforces Japan’s nuclear hedge by revisiting old problems without 
new solutions for security assurances while actively desensitizing a nuclear-allergic 
population. 
1. Technological Factors 
Today, Japan’s state of nuclear expertise is the key factor in supporting its nuclear 
hedge. Japan’s mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle rivals or exceeds most nuclear weapon 
states. It answers the international question of whether it is possible for Japan to go 
nuclear. The challenge Japan faces in nuclear pursuit is in mobilizing the energy and 
scientific communities to deviate from their norms to support nuclear armament. The 
reality is that there is a resident industrial capability to nationalize should Japan choose to 
do so. This section briefly looks at nuclear energy in Japan, the scientific and energy 
communities’ concerns with nuclear acquisition, and the challenge of military 
application. 
Japan, like many other countries, started its nuclear energy program under 
President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace,” initiative. The United States presented 
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nuclear energy in an attempt to downplay the negative public perception of its nuclear 
arsenal.195 In Japan, the aversion to all things nuclear was at a fever pitch as a result of 
the 1954 irradiation of the Japanese fishermen aboard the Lucky Dragon Five by U.S. 
hydrogen-bomb testing at Bikini Atoll.196 Despite this unfortunate event, Japan signed 
the Atomic Energy Basic law into effect and subsequent nuclear cooperation agreement 
with the United States that provided Japan with HEU.197 Within a year of adoption, 
nuclear energy became key to the Japanese energy strategy. By 1957, the Japanese 
contracted the construction of 20 more reactors.198 As of 2016, Japan uses nuclear power 
to offset the 84 percent of energy requirements it imports.199  
Japan’s reprocessing capability is what gives the nation a comparative advantage 
should it seek nuclear weapons. Reprocessing allows a nation to develop plutonium if it 
pursues weapons. This capability alone allows Japan to revisit nuclearization. When it 
first acceded to the NPT, Japan sought assurances from the United States that its rights to 
reprocess would not be infringed upon. Japan’s expenditure of over $25 billion and thirty 
years to bring the not-yet-functional Rokkasho reprocessing facility online demonstrates 
its unwavering commitment to this advanced fuel-cycle capability. 200 
The inherent conflict between the energy industry and the government further 
complicates Japan’s nuclear hedge. Should the government conduct research into the 
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military application of nuclear weapons using its national brain trust, it would come at a 
risk of international exposure to the energy companies. This exposure could lead to 
sanctions that cut off nuclear fuel, such as uranium, and technology that complicates the 
energy industry’s ability to operate at capacity. This risk also resonates with the scientists 
who support the nuclear power industry, for they do not wish to see their access to 
innovative technologies denied. Katsuhisa Furukawa claims that the strong streak of 
pacifism in the scientific and academic communities presents further challenges to 
military application.201 Ultimately, it is in the interest of the energy companies and the 
attitudes of the scientific community to avoid aiding a government’s illicit nuclear 
activities. Mobilizing industrial and scientific communities aside, Japan’s Atomic Energy 
Agency (JAEA) possesses enough plutonium isotope 240 (PU240) to make numerous 
nuclear weapons.202 While PU240 is not optimal for producing weapons, it is sufficient for 
a hedge arsenal. 
If Japan seeks a credible deterrent, it will have to address many technical and non-
technical challenges in creating one. The immediate concern is in building the nuclear 
explosive package (NEP), which requires warhead design and metallurgical experience to 
fabricate it. The design would have to integrate delivery systems, such as missiles, 
submarines, or bombs, to deliver the NEP to its target.203 Integration of these systems 
requires testing facilities that raise the signature of the program. To reduce these 
signatures, the effort requires a substantial counter-intelligence program. Establishment 
of a deterrent also requires strategic doctrine regarding command and control, 
survivability, and use. None of these restraints are insurmountable for a highly advanced, 
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technical nation that already possesses a nuclear fuel cycle. The challenge is building a 
team from a bench of disparate experts who are likely ideologically opposed to the effort. 
Today, Japan’s state of nuclear capacity supports its policy of nuclear hedging. 
The Japanese mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and possession of advanced nuclear 
capabilities normally resident in nuclear weapon states allows for the quick transition 
demanded by Levite’s definition of nuclear hedging. Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle supports 
rapidly producing the nuclear weapon a hedging strategy demands, but military 
integration and delivery-system development present challenges for a turn-key deterrent. 
2. Economics   
Japan is currently the third largest economy in the world. The Yoshida doctrine 
put Japan on that trajectory. The 1968/70 report’s warnings that Japanese nuclear pursuit 
would isolate the nation politically apply equally to its economics. Japan has done the 
calculations of what a program costs to build, but the true cost is the economic impact of 
sanctions resulting from exposure. This section explores the real cost associated with 
nuclear pursuit or, conversely, the benefit of hedging. 
Japan currently imports $624 billion worth of goods and exports $625 billion.204 
It ranks fourth in the world for exporting goods. Its key trading partners in both import 
and export markets are the United States and China.205 Breaking out from the NPT would 
likely force sanctions from both of these members of the United Nation’s Security 
Council.206 Considering Japan’s dependence on imported raw materials, such as oil, 
food, and metals, the effects of sanctions are less likely impact partners than Japan 
itself.207  
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Japan’s energy security is also an important factor. Japan is second only to the 
United States in oil imports.208 Japan’s key energy partners include Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, Qatar, and China. Economic sanctions as a result of nuclear pursuit would 
constrain not only imports of fossil fuels but also the receipt of nuclear fuel to power 
Japan’s energy plants, which represented approximately 29 percent of total energy 
production in 2010.209 In the post Fukushima experience, the nuclear energy lobby is 
persuading an eventual return to nuclear power despite mass protests from the population. 
Japan’s “new growth” strategy is predicated on becoming an exporter of nuclear energy 
infrastructure to countries such as Vietnam.210 For large national companies, such as 
Mitsubishi and Hitachi, the potential to lose out on future international deals is high.211 It 
is logical that these multi-national corporations’ interests would lobby against 
government policy that undermines their profitability. 
Japan’s subtle nuclear hedge was recently referenced in connection with 
American economic commitments. Speaking on behalf of Asian partners of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated that the U.S. 
potential inability to follow through on the trade deal might signal a similar unwillingness 
to make good on its commitment to provide Japan with extended deterrence.212 This 
statement highlights regional awareness of the reciprocal nature of Japan’s nuclear hedge 
and its ability to leverage the United States. There is a fine balance to this tactic; the 
United States has adroitly shown the ability to decouple security during the trade 
discussions of the late eighties and early nineties. 
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In Japan’s security situation, economic interdependence serves as a deterrent from 
going nuclear. For a nation that thrives on the export market and survives on the import 
market, nuclear pursuit comes at a high cost while nuclear hedging provides a low-cost 
alternative. 
F. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
Japan’s relationship with nonproliferation regimes represents an unusual 
dichotomy. Japan is the most ardent supporter of nonproliferation, which perennially 
pushes the UN General Assembly for a global ban on nuclear weapons, yet it relies on 
those same U.S. weapons for its vital security interests. Japan has a long track record of 
not only joining various non-proliferation institutions but also being a standard bearer and 
one of their most active members. This section explores the nonproliferation history of 
Japan and its implications for nuclear hedging. 
Japan joined the IAEA in 1957 and was the first nation to receive nuclear energy 
assistance under nuclear safeguards.213 The Japanese acquiesced to the NPT in 1970 and 
ratified it in 1976 after much debate. Prime Minister Sato, the author of the Japan’s four 
pillars of nonproliferation, acceded to U.S. pressure in light of the guarantee of extended 
deterrence. Japan acceded to the NPT to secure two things from the United States: 
continued protection under the nuclear umbrella and recognition of its right to 
reprocess.214 In 1974, Sato received the Nobel Peace Prize in a similar aspirational 
manner as President Obama in the aftermath of his Prague speech.215 The Nobel Prize 
cemented his four nuclear pillars within the Japanese government although Sato was 
rumored to have private concerns about the policy. In 1977, Japan agreed to the 
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comprehensive safeguards of a non-nuclear weapon state and found itself a staunch 
nonproliferation advocate with a significant resident nuclear capability. 216 
In current times, Japan continues to be a stalwart nonproliferation advocate. It has 
been an upstanding member of the NSG and a member of the MCTR since 1987 and has 
pushed for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.217 Only once has Japan balked 
in the face of nonproliferation, the permanent extension of the NPT in 1995. Prior to 
providing its signature to the extension, Japan secretly researched the benefits of nuclear 
nationhood in the 1995 Japanese Defense Agency Study and contemplated not signing 
the extension.218 Japan has since signed the additional protocol to the NPT in 1999.219 In 
the wake of the North Korean tests, Japan quickly imposed unilateral economic sanctions 
and has been a staunch advocate for disarmament.  
Japan has joined every nonproliferation venture. A departure from 
nonproliferation would impose significant consequences to international nonproliferation 
norms. Since ratifying the NPT in 1976, the Japanese have pursued a pragmatic dual-
track approach that seeks security through the aspiration of a nuclear-free world balanced 
with the reality of its protection under a nuclear umbrella. Japan’s strict adherence and 
leadership role in nonproliferation regimes strengthens its hedge. Japan’s departure from 
nonproliferation regimes could create a domino effect of nations that proliferate. If the 
United States prevents proliferation and Japan’s desired an end-state is continued 
extended deterrence, it is in U.S. interest to continue providing extended deterrence to 
Japan. 
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Japan is a nation that lives dual lives. In one life, Japan is a staunch realist that 
understands its regional security needs and the implications of its actions in reference to 
its nuclear neighbors. In the other life, its idealistic drive to nuclear zero through 
nonproliferation and disarmament stands in stark contrast to its possession of the nuclear 
infrastructure to produce a bomb while living under the protection of a nuclear umbrella. 
It views both efforts as complementary and seeks to ensure that while there are nuclear 
weapons in the world, they will not be left unsecured. This section concludes by 
comparing and contrasting the Japanese case with the Pakistani case to highlight the 
differences in the case studies. 
In comparing the element of threat between Japan and Pakistan, both nations face 
overwhelming challenges with the aggregate power of their nuclear-armed adversaries. 
Japan differs starkly from Pakistan in that it does not share a land border with its 
adversary. Nevertheless, both nations share contested regions with their adversaries, the 
Senkaku Islands and Kashmir, respectively. Japan enjoys the physical separation of water 
that inhibits its adversary’s ability to occupy territory. Whereas the Pakistanis must 
contend with the possible invasion of a nuclear-armed adversary, the Japanese focus on 
contested territories separated from the homeland where the escalation ladder is extended 
and major war is less likely.  
Pakistan has attempted to offset latent and military disadvantages with India 
through the alliances of CENTO and SEATO. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s allies diverged 
in their security goal. While Pakistan needed security from India, CENTO and SEATO 
sought to counter the spread of communism. Pakistan also made miscalculations about 
the terms of its defense treaty with the United States. The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 
promised U.S. aid in the case foreign invasion of Pakistan, but the United States could 
not be reasonably expected to back aggression against India.  
The Japanese approach of the Yoshida Doctrine supported by the Mutual Defense 
Treaty of 1952 created a defense that steadily grew together with the United States 
against threats of mutual strategic importance. This was largely based on Japan’s security 
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dependence. This contrasts sharply with the strain of Pakistan’s multiple conflicts with 
India, the rocky relationship with Washington, and its relationship with China.  
The case studies illustrate Pakistan’s divergence and Japan’s convergence with 
U.S. security interests. Pakistan sought nuclear security from India, a threat that diverged 
with U.S. interests. Japan seeks security from North Korea and China and ardently strives 
to maintain the convergence of security interests with the United States. The underlying 
finding is that properly maintained alliances are critical in forestalling nuclear pursuit. A 
potential indicator trending toward nuclear pursuit is divergence from allies whereas 
convergence may indicate abstention or nuclear hedging. 
The interaction of political, military, and scientific communities in Pakistan 
allowed for the unified pursuit of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Bhutto unified these 
groups upon the assumption of power under martial law. In democratic Japan, these 
institutions remain disconnected. Cabinets fell upon the mere suggestion of nuclear 
pursuit, making the topic a politically charged one. Changes such as the posture of the 
Japanese Self Defense Force have sparked protest and even political fist fights. The 
military, as evidenced in the Japanese Defense Agency report, remains pragmatic in its 
evaluation of Japan’s nuclear posture, citing the advantages of continued alliance and 
disadvantages of cost and strategic implications of nuclear ownership. It must also be said 
that Japan’s armed forces also favor leaving a hedge option open should conditions 
change. Also, the energy industry in Japan runs the vast majority of the nuclear energy 
and research enterprise. An attempt to pursue nuclear weapons in Japan immediately puts 
politics, profit, and patriotism in conflict. 
In Pakistan, Bhutto put his own man in charge of the PAEC, an entity that 
nationalized Pakistan’s nuclear efforts. This action gave him independent control over the 
scientific community. As demonstrated in Pakistan, an increased collusion of military, 
scientific, and political communities serves as a potential indicator of nuclear pursuit. 
Political ambiguity based on a public posture of not developing weapons but maintaining 
capability is indicative of nuclear hedging. 
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Technological development is a strong determinant of the ability to produce 
nuclear weapons. A high level of nuclear development reduces the time it takes a nation 
to build a weapon. In Pakistan’s case, a technologically backward, poor nation was able 
to harness the intellectual capability of its scientific community with the help of loyal 
expatriates, luck, and considerable foreign assistance from China to produce an 
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle and weapons program. Pakistan’s case also highlights the 
concurrent development of delivery technologies with foreign assistance to produce its 
nuclear deterrent.  
In Japan’s case, the technological building blocks are present in disparate areas of 
industry but lack a unifying effort. The threat to put these blocks together is what makes 
the Japanese hedge effective. Japan can launch satellites into space, manage a ballistic 
missile defense, enrich and reprocess nuclear fuel, and even possess the significant 
quantities of SNM required to produce a bomb. Indicators of pursuit are substantial rapid 
investment in the nuclear fuel cycle and increased interactions with a nuclear weapon 
state. Continued lack of horizontal synchronization within the technological communities 
may be indicative of a hedging state. 
Pakistan evaluated the economic worth of security independence. The cost of its 
nuclear pursuit came at considerable loss of foreign aid and access to emerging 
technologies as a result of sanctions for its nuclear pursuit. It capitalized on significant, 
sympathetic Islamic allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Libya, to fund its nuclear program in 
times of need. Pakistan also benefited from sporadic periods of strategic importance that 
provided respite from sanctions. It provided a staging base for U-2 spy planes in the 
1960s, a projection platform for CIA efforts in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and a logistic 
hub for the recent Afghan invasion by the United States. Pakistan leveraged its 
geopolitical advantages to gain space for its nuclear program.  
Japan’s approach to security differs. It does not seek security independence; it 
seeks security guarantees. It was thrust into an alliance with the United States upon 
resuming its sovereignty and fell under the U.S. nuclear umbrella after the Chinese 
nuclear test. A policy of hedging allows Japan to maintain consistent support for its 
security and economic interests and remain a loyal ally to the United States. Japan is the 
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fourth-largest exporter of goods and a nation reliant on foreign energy imports. The risk 
of sanction for illicit nuclear activities would mobilize industry and the population to 
protest at the risk incurred to the economy and standards of living. Unresponsiveness to 
economic sanctions may serve as an indicator of pursuit while increased economic 
interdependence favors a continued policy of hedging. 
The value of and interpretation of international regimes, such as the NPT, factors 
heavily in nuclear pursuit and restraint. The Pakistanis rejected nonproliferation efforts. 
From the lens of their bipolar security rivalry with India, these arrangements provided no 
benefits. If nuclear weapons went away tomorrow, India would still be left with a 
comparative advantage. This has prompted Pakistan to adopt the defiant attitude of 
accepting international nonproliferation norms as soon as India does. Japan’s revered 
position in the nonproliferation community is reflective of its population’s acquired 
allergy toward nuclear weapons. Japan’s ensconced position within the nonproliferation 
community also allows a different diplomatic approach. Politically, Japan can leverage its 
participation in nonproliferation activities to ensure U.S. guarantees of protection. For 
nations that steadily advocate nonproliferation, changes in rhetoric or upticks in nuclear 
discussions may indicate the need for increased assurance. Threats of departure or 
decreases in nonproliferation advocacy may support a hedging strategy.  
In summary, threat drives nuclear considerations, as depicted in Figure 7. 
Alliances count, but the convergence of mutual security interests within those alliances is 
more important for ensuring security. The United States underwrote Japanese security 
vis-à-vis North Korea and China but walked away from Pakistan in its perpetual conflict 
with India. Disconnects among the political, military, and scientific communities favor 
hedging whereas unity favors pursuit. A relevant, resident technological capability is 
required to make a nuclear hedge credible whereas increased rapid investment and 
foreign assistance indicates nuclear pursuit. Internationally interdependent economies 
favor hedging or restraint. A strong valuation of nonproliferation regimes lends to 
restraint but can accentuate a hedging strategy. The next chapter seeks to apply these 
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V. SAUDI ARABIA: NOT QUITE A HEDGE 
“Saudi Arabia will do whatever it takes to protect the nation and people 
from any harm and I will leave it at that.” 
 —Saudi Foreign Minister Abel Al-Jubier 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Foreign Minister Abel Al-Jabier offered this ambiguous statement to CNN’s Wolf 
Blitzer when pressed for the official Saudi position on nuclear weapons vis-à-vis Iran in 
the wake of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).220 The plan, adopted on 
October 18, 2015, and implemented on January 16, 2016, seeks to prevent Iran’s ability 
to pursue nuclear weapons. Some international leaders, such as Secretary of State Kerry, 
herald the agreement as a triumph of diplomacy that has prevented an Iranian nuclear 
program, which has been in the works for over 20 years. Others, such as Wyn Bowen and 
Matthew Moran, conclude that the deal resulted in international acceptance of nuclear 
hedging.221 In the deal, Iran preserved its uranium enrichment capability in exchange for 
increased monitoring by the IAEA to achieve sanction relief. While the merits of the deal 
are debatable, its duration is finite. There is no guarantee that Iran will show restraint 
after the agreement expires in 15 years. This begs the question as to whether Saudi 
Arabia will follow suit and invest in a nuclear-hedging capacity. 
In the lead-up to the agreement, Saudi Arabian insiders were quick to offer 
statements intimating that if Iran gets the bomb, they would follow suit. After the 
agreement, the views of Saudis varied—from directly opposing the arrangement, to 
maintaining equivalent abilities by enriching nuclear fuel, to King Salman’s publicly 
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endorsing the JCPOA.222 Pundits take different views regarding the Saudis’ ability to 
match Iran. Fareed Zakaria asserts that Saudi Arabia is incapable of producing an 
automobile let alone nuclear weapons.223 Prince Turki al-Faisal countered in an interview 
that Zakaria might have to “eat his words” when the first Saudi car rolls off the assembly 
line in a few years.224 In this interview, Prince Turki al-Faisal also asserts that Saudi 
Arabia has embarked on an odyssey to ensure that the country’s investment in nuclear 
power materializes as the Iran deal expires. 
The JCPOA highlights the advanced state of Iranian nuclear research while 
exposing the dearth of capability in security rivals such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This 
chapter incorporates the methods and findings of the previous two chapters to analyze the 
Kingdom’s potential to hedge from the perspectives of threat, domestic factors, and 
international regimes. This chapter commences with a brief history to highlight how Iran 
transcended from an ideological threat to a regional adversary of Saudi Arabia. The 
second section evaluates the Iranian threat to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi relationships 
with the United States and Pakistan. The third section scrutinizes Saudi Arabian domestic 
concerns, such as intergovernmental capacity, technological capability, and economic 
factors, that either aid or prevent Saudi nuclear hedging. The fourth section weighs the 
Saudi attitude toward international regimes and the effect it has on the Saudi nuclear 
calculus. The chapter concludes with a summary and evaluation of the factors pertaining 
to Saudi nuclear proliferation as well as their implications for nuclear hedging. 
B. HISTORY 
In 1932, King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud formally established the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and subsumed the Hijaz region, known for the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. 
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The Kingdom began as an impoverished nation until prospects of oil emerged in the 
1930s, and foreign investors started paying for oil exploration rights to the Kingdom. The 
Kingdom granted first oil exploration rights to the United States because  Americans bore 
no colonial intent.225 World War II prevented the Kingdom’s and U.S. petroleum 
companies from capitalizing on the newfound oil reserves. The U.S. government 
recognized the strategic importance of Saudi Arabian oil reserves as well as the 
substantial American investment in the country and subsidized the impoverished Saudi 
economy under the Lend Lease Act.226  
The U.S.–Saudi security relationship grew with the economic development of the 
Kingdom. This relationship weathered turbulence when the United States recognized 
Israel in 1948 and subsequently aided the Israelis in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, which 
resulted in the infamous oil embargo against the United States and its Western allies. The 
Saudis were tolerant of the relationship the United States maintained with the Iranians as 
both Iran and Saudi Arabia found consensus in their anti-communist, pro-Western views. 
The fall of the Shah during the Iranian revolution surfaced Saudi fears of a rising Iranian 
hegemon based on the ideological zeal of Ayatollah Khomeini and the residual military 
capabilities of Iran.227 The Saudis counter-balanced Iran by backing Saddam Hussein’s 
military with financial aid and airfield usage rights.228 The increased regional hostilities 
and the Iran hostage crisis prompted the United States to create the United States Central 
Command (CENTCOM) to reassure regional partners.229 CENTCOM-led efforts in the 
1980s to protect Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers devolved into open hostilities between the 
United States and Iran known as the “tanker wars.” Saudi–Iranian tensions spiked during 
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this era, culminating in a thwarted Iranian attempt to stage an attack in Saudi Arabia 
during the 1987 Hajj in which 450 Iranians perished at the hands of Saudi security 
forces.230  
Shortly before the collapse of communism, Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of 
Kuwait threatened the Middle-Eastern status quo. A U.S.-led coalition, which included 
Saudi Arabia, was quick to eject Hussein from Kuwait and restore sovereignty to the 
Kuwaitis. In the late 1990s, reports of Iranian nuclear exploration began to emerge.231 In 
1996, President Clinton signed sanctions against Iran and Libya for weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) procurement and support of terrorism.232 A steady string of 
indicators emerged over the following years pointing to Iranian uranium enrichment and 
a pattern of refusing IAEA inspections. During the breakup of the A. Q. Khan ring, 
inspectors discovered that Khan had shared centrifuge technology with Iran.  
When the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq commenced in 2003, Saudi Arabia openly 
advised against the effort, fearing that without Hussein, Iraq would tilt toward a Shia 
majority sympathetic to Iran. Since the fall of Iraq and the extension of Iranian influence 
in Baghdad’s politics, Saudi Arabia has witnessed growing Iranian influence through 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Shiite militias in Iran, the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in 
Yemen, and the Iranian support for Bashar Asad’s Syrian regime.  
The revelation of an Iranian nuclear enrichment program and its suspected 
military applications has further unsettled Iranian and Saudi relations. In the run up to the 
signature of the JCPOA, Saudi Arabia joined Israel in sharing reservations about the 
                                                 
230 Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran, 52–53. 
231 Shreeya Sinha and Susan Campbell Beachy, “Timeline on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” New York 
Times, April 2, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear-
timeline.html?_r=1#/#time243_7250. 
232 William J. Clinton, “Remarks on Signing the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 and an 
Exchange with Reporters,” Washington, DC, August 5, 1996, accessed September 4, 2016, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=53160#axzz1rCWoGB2A. 
 87 
deal.233 The underlying fear was that the agreement would embolden Iran’s support of its 
regional proxies and leave a latent nuclear capability that Iran could restart should it 
chose to abrogate the deal. The next section explores the threat calculus of Saudi Arabia 
and looks at its alliance options in the face of a nuclear Iran. 
C. SECURITY FACTORS 
Scholars often frame Iran and Saudi Arabia as ideological opponents in the 
simplistic manner of Sunni versus Shia. In the Middle Eastern perspective, security is a 
zero-sum game wherein the rise of one nation’s offensive capability and security detracts 
from the others. Saudi Arabia seeks to maintain the status quo in the Middle East by 
offsetting threats. It has shown no compunction in dealing with the likes of secular 
nationalists like Saddam Hussein in regards to Iran and does not hesitate to pursue its 
own policies, such as acquiring missiles from China, when denied by the United States. 
The current contest in the Middle East is a battle for the fringe states in which a lack of 
governance reigns and the ability to influence populations persists.234 
Traditionally, Saudi Arabia has found its security rival in Israel, but that is 
changing as an assertive Iran challenges both nations. As such, Saudi Arabia’s primary 
security threats arise from Iran’s proxy engagement and nuclear capability. From the 
Saudi Arabian perspective, instability in Yemen and Iraq and the rise of the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are intractably linked to Iran. These threats culminate to 
challenge the legitimacy of the Kingdom in its role of defender of the Umma, or the 
collective Muslim community.235 In the case of Yemen, Saudi Arabia seeks to assert its 
regional leadership and maintain influence by restoring a failed regime against Iranian-
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armed Houthi rebels; a loss in Yemen would undermine Saudi credibility in the region.236 
Regarding Iraq, Saudi concern originates from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Council 
(IRGC)-supported Shiite militias fighting on behalf of the Iraqi government. Both Iran 
and Saudi Arabia view the Iraqi government as a battleground for influence with both 
investing heavily in political candidates.237 ISIS also presents a unique challenge as it 
forces Saudi Arabia to contend with growing domestic extremism and the ideological 
challenge to the royal family by Al Baghdadi’s assertion of caliph over the Islamic 
world.238 Given the myriad factors challenging security, Saudi Arabia’s main threat still 
emanates from Iran, its ideological and regional polar opposite. Figure 8 depicts growing 
Iranian influence and objectives in the Middle East. 
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Figure 8.  Iranian Influence and Involvement in the Middle East.239 
Saudi Arabia invests heavily in its military while Iran remains under sanction for 
advanced military weapons. Its prime vendor remains the United States with military 
sales totaling almost $112 billion between 2010 and 2015.240 In addition to seeking new 
tanks from the United States to replace combat losses, Saudi Arabia has ordered $15 
billion worth of armored vehicles from Canada.241 Saudi Arabia’s purchases include 
high-tech items such as F-15 upgrades, Apache Longbow helicopters, and Patriot 
missiles.242 
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Iran’s military is in a state of recovery as it attempts to resume arms purchases 
after being under UN sanctions since 2007.243 These sanctions, in addition to operational 
use, have taken their toll on the maintenance and refurbishment of Iran’s capital military 
equipment. This was clear when the IRGC’s attempt to take Tikrit from ISIS stalled and 
U.S. air support was requested by Iraq to dislodge the ISIS forces.244 In April 2016, Iran 
took delivery of the S-300 air defense system from Russia.245 As sanctions recede, 
Russia seeks to be the main supplier of Iranian arms, but residual sanctions from the 
JCPOA complicate sales for the next five years.246  
The numbers in Table 4 show the numeric advantage in favor of Iran. 
Operationally, the forces are on opposite ends of the spectrum. Through perennial 
engagement, Iranian forces learned to leverage asymmetric advantages to offset 
equipping shortages. In terms of loyalty and reliability, the Iranian military went through 
a purge in the wake of its 1979 revolution, and its leadership was vetted through 
continual engagements during the Iraq–Iran War. Saudi Arabia differs in that it possesses 
a relatively high-tech, well-funded, and well-maintained force that is relatively untested 
in battle. Recent engagement in Yemen and sorties flown in support of coalition strikes in 
Syria are changing this paradigm. Although technically proficient, senior Saudi officers 
advance through political promotion versus a meritocracy-based system to ensure fealty 
to the crown.247 
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 Iranian and Saudi Arabian Latent and Military Strength in 2016248 Table 4.  
Latent Strength Iran Saudi Arabia +/- Diff 
 Population 81,824,270 27,752,316 66.08% 
 GDP $397 Billion $632 Billion 37.19% 
    
Military Strength Iran Saudi Arabia +/- Diff 
 Manpower 523,000 227,000 66.60% 
 Tanks 1663 730 66.11% 
 Aircraft 334 325 2.7% 
 Surface Combatant Ships - 7 - 
 Coastal Craft 69 69 0% 
 Submarines 29 - - 
 IRBMs - 10 - 
 SRBMs 18 - - 
 MRBMs 22 *reported DF-21 - 
  
 
In 2002, extensive nuclear activities were discovered in Iran at the Natanz and 
Arak facilities.249 This revelation and the 2003 IAEA account of Iran’s failure to meet 
reporting standards for its nuclear activities prompted international concern that Iran was 
seeking nuclear weapons.250 Iran claimed peaceful intentions and offered it committed a 
simple oversight to report the beginning of enrichment. The covert nature, military 
dimensions, and economic infeasibility of the nuclear program led IAEA investigators to 
think otherwise.251 As the story unfolded, a defector provided an Iranian laptop that had 
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information regarding nuclear-weapon development labeled “project 111.”252 The next 
couple of years saw a series of negotiations between Iran and France, Germany, and 
England to curb Iranian nuclear aspirations. These negotiations resulted in the 2004 
intervention of Russia, China, and the United States in Paris during which Iran agreed to 
suspend enrichment.253 Iran quickly cancelled the deal, and the IAEA referred the matter 
to the UN Security Council. Iran remained defiant and asserted its right to peaceful 
nuclear enrichment. Over the next nine years, the UN Security Council drafted  
resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, and 2224 to encourage Iran to abandon 
its nuclear program and come to the bargaining table.254 
The need for sanction relief finally brought Iran to the bargaining table. Iran and 
the P5+1 nations reached an initial agreement, known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), 
on November 24, 2013.255 Iran agreed to halt parts of its program, such as enrichment 
activities at Natanz, and rolled back others, such as diluting enriched uranium by 20 
percent, in exchange for sanction relief.256 This plan served as a confidence-building 
measure that paved the way for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in which Iran 
agreed to forgo enrichment activity for 10 years and submit to IAEA monitoring under 
the additional protocols of the NPT in exchange for sanction relief. The critique of this 
agreement is that it leaves a latent nuclear capability for Iran to resume nuclear pursuit 
should it elect to do so.  
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The JCPOA brought world powers together to discourage Iranian nuclear pursuit. 
Because each of these nations has disparate security and economic interests, the deal 
allows for snapback sanctions for which a unanimous security vote is not required. 
Despite these snapback sanctions, there is inherent frailty in the effort as time passes and 
national interests diverge. For example, Russia recently experimented with staging forces 
within Iran to support its efforts in Syria.257 The lifting of UN arms sanctions, proposed 
changes to the Arak reactor, and the subsequent nuclear fuel provision stand to benefit 
the Russian economy. Overtime, national self-interest may undermine the effort even 
though the deal allows for snapback sanctions.258 
Throughout the continuing episode of the Iranian nuclear drama, Iran’s leadership 
has displayed defiance and boisterous rhetoric that has exacerbated international fears. At 
one point, a misconstrued statement had President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad advocating 
that Israel be “wiped off the map.”259 Adding to the international concern was Iran’s 
continual procurement activities; in 2006, Undersecretary Joseph blamed the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) for stopping procurement of missile and heavy-water 
equipment.260 The Iranian defiance of its agreements under the NPT, coupled with the 
ambiguity of the Iranian nuclear program, compounded by the continual procurement 
attempts of nuclear and missile materials, adds up to a threat that points to Iran’s eventual 
nuclearization. Proxy engagement with Iran coupled with the fact that Saudi Arabia is 
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well within the range of its Shahab series of missiles establishes a nuclear Iran as a major 
security challenge to the Kingdom.261 
Today, Saudi Arabia  maintains a wait-and-see attitude regarding Iranian 
compliance with the JCPOA. To say the relations between the two nations are at a nadir 
is an understatement. The recent Iranian storming and burning of a Saudi Arabian 
Embassy in the aftermath of the Kingdom’s execution of a Shia cleric and the persistent 
proxy military engagement has led to an intense security rivalry throughout the region. 
1. Tenuous Alliances as an Offset to Nuclear Acquisition 
This section explores Saudi Arabia’s relationship with its two nuclear allies, the 
United States and Pakistan, and how the strength of those alliances may help to determine 
whether the Kingdom stops at nuclear hedging or moves toward acquiring a nuclear 
weapons capability. The U.S.–Saudi relationship shows how the security partnership has 
survived periods of intense friction to maintain a lasting informal alliance based on 
converging mutual interests. If Saudi Arabia feels it is unable to offset Iran through its 
traditional partnership with the United States, there is the option to turn to its other 
nuclear ally, Pakistan. This section begins with a review of U.S.–Saudi relations and 
concludes with a review of the speculation regarding a Saudi–Pakistani nuclear 
arrangement. 
The United States is one of the Kingdom’s oldest allies. The friendship between 
the nations grew through mutual oil exploitation and U.S. economic relief during World 
War II. Franklin Delano Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud cemented this relationship during 
the first head of state meeting between the two countries aboard the U.S.S. Quincy in 
1945.262 During the visit, the two men discussed the post-war plight of the Jews, 
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culminating in a promise that the United States would take no action without consultation 
with Saud.263 President Harry S. Truman quickly reversed FDR’s position and 
recognized Israel. While the king was greatly disappointed, the relationship survived. 
After the creation of Israel, Saudi Arabia permitted the United States to use the Dhahran 
airfield through the 1949 Dhahran Airfield Agreement.264 The Mutual Defense 
Agreement signed on June 18, 1951 quickly followed this agreement.265 This agreement 
created the U.S. military training and assistance mission in Saudi Arabia and formalized 
further military assistance. The Kingdom viewed the Soviet Union, Iraq, and Jordan as its 
biggest threats and believed that the strong bilateral relations with the United States 
provided the necessary offset to ensure future security.266 This mixture of threats led to 
Saudi Arabia abstaining from joining the Central Treaty Organization and continuing to 
rely on bilateral security arrangements. 
The U.S.–Saudi relationship experienced its first major rift with the 1973 Arab–
Israeli War. President Nixon promised the Saudis that he would remain neutral in Israeli–
Arab relations and then promptly pushed a $2.2 billion aid package through congress for 
Israel.267 This prompted Saudi Arabia and other nations among the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to initiate an oil embargo against the United 
States and its allies, which drastically inflated oils prices until 1974. This event highlights 
Saudi Arabia’s willingness to part from the United States in pursuing its own interests. 
The Arab world often sees the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as a U.S. failure 
to thwart communism at the expense of an Islamic nation. This prompted the issuance of 
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the Carter Doctrine in which President Carter proclaimed during a State of the Union 
address that the United States would use force if necessary to counter military aggression 
in the Gulf region.268   
The fall of the Shah and the commencement of the Iran–Iraq War in 1980 
changed the security dynamic for Saudi Arabia. Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution in Iran 
raised concerns for Saudi Arabia on two fronts: the rise of an ideologically opposed 
nation that would challenge the regional status quo and the fear that revolution would 
spread to other governments. Iraq’s immediate engagement of Iran provided an 
immediate counterbalance. During the war, Saudi Arabia backed Iraq. Saudi support was 
not just limited to countering Iran; when Israel bombed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facilities, 
the Kingdom offered to pay to rebuild the damaged Iraqi facilities.269 This support did 
not come without risk; Iran threatened the oil tankers by mining and blockading the 
Persian Gulf. The United States was quick to mobilize the Carter Doctrine in justifying 
the protection of Kuwaiti and Saudi shipping from the Iranians. During the Iran–Iraqi 
War, Saudi Arabia took advantage of the preoccupation of Iraq and Iran and began to 
assert itself as a regional power. It departed from bilateral security arrangements and 
assumed a growing role within the emerging Gulf Cooperation Council.270  
After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States assembled a coalition to liberate 
Kuwait in what was to become Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This was a 
departure for Saudi Arabia; it was forced to accommodate the presence of Western forces 
on the soil of the holy land. The presence of Western troops also called the Kingdom’s 
legitimacy into question regarding its role as protector of the Umma. Al Qaeda often cites 
this presence in its narrative of the Saudi royal family placating Western incursion. Post-
9/11 tensions escalated between the nations when 15 of the 19 hijackers were identified 
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as Saudi citizens. When the 2003 invasion of Iraq took place, the Saudis were quick to 
disapprove the effort, highlighting that disposing Hussein would favor Iran by disrupting 
the regional status quo. These events mark another low point in U.S.–Saudi relations. 
During the process leading to the JCPOA, the Saudis felt betrayed by the United 
States’ desire to conclude an agreement with Iran at the cost of their security.271 The 
Kingdom shared its displeasure with the United States and engaged in a rhetoric of 
“whatever they have, we’ll get.” Immediately after the signing of the JCPOA, the United 
States sent high-level delegations, including Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and 
Secretary of State John Kerry, to reassure the Saudis of U.S. security commitments.272 
Today, the United States maintains a full court press to reassure its Gulf allies. 
The United States has increased arms sales to Saudi Arabia and currently provides 
military assistance to Operation Restoring Hope in Yemen. The U.S. support to this 
operation is premised on the need to show support for Saudi Arabia and not necessarily 
on the merit of the effort.273 The United States and the GCC engaged in security summits 
in 2015 and 2016 to come to a tepid agreement on collective defense.274 As a result, the 
Saudi government snubbed President Obama during his official visit to Saudi Arabia by 
having the governor of Riyadh receive him vice the King himself.275 Despite the snub, 
the continued arms support to Saudi Arabia in light of alleged human rights violations in 
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Yemen proves that the Obama administration is willing to bridge the gap between the 
nations.276 
Pakistan represents an alternative approach to Saudi security challenges. Some 
observers argue that Saudi Arabia will simply buy a weapon or perhaps lease a nuclear 
umbrella from Pakistan to counter Iran. Rumors of secret deals between Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia abound. The commonly cited proof is Saudi Arabia’s financial aid to 
Pakistan during its development of the “Islam bomb.”277 The next key piece cited is 
Saudi Prince Sultan’s visit to Kahuta and the ensuing rumors that he toured non-
safeguarded Pakistani nuclear-weapon facilities.278 Strengthening the theory is the Saudi 
Arabian provision of oil when post-nuclear sanctions hit Pakistan the hardest. The recent 
attendance by the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff at the Saudi public parade, displaying 
the 1986 Saudi purchase of Chinese CSS-2 missiles, fuels this speculation.279 
The counter argument is that Pakistan is not at the beck and call of Saudi Arabian 
whims and remains leery of further international sanctions. In 2014, when Saudi Arabia 
called on its partners to help intervene in Yemen, Pakistan politely refused.280 There was 
an extrapolation of the Pakistani approach to Yemen applied to the Saudi–Pakistani 
relationship regarding potential nuclear deals; very few sources mention that the 
Pakistani military was also decisively engaged in an anti-terror campaign in its Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas. 
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The truth is that no one can confirm or deny the secret Pakistani–Saudi theory. 
The irony of the theory is that Saudi Arabia seeks protection from Iran through Pakistan, 
a nation that through its national hero, A. Q. Khan, assisted Iranian nuclear efforts via its 
illicit smuggling ring. Saudi Arabia would have to weigh consequences of such a deal or 
alliance as it could come at the expense of American relations that supply a steady stream 
of arms for current fights against Iranian proxies. 
D. DOMESTIC FACTORS 
Determining domestic factors in Saudi Arabia from the three nuclear communities 
presents a challenge because of the opacity of the decision-making cycle of the royal 
family, the nature of the Saudi military, and the scientific community’s diminutive 
stature. This section looks at these decision-making communities from the Saudi 
perspective and concludes by reviewing Saudi rhetoric regarding nuclear weapons.  
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy with the Quran as its constitution under the 
Basic Law of 1992. An appointed national Shura, or advisory council, whereby citizens 
appointed by the monarchy advise and oversee select governmental functions.281 There 
are thousands of Saudi princes but very few exercise political sway with the King, and 
only his inner circle wields true decision-making authority. This inner circle usually 
includes the crown prince, the deputy crown prince, and the ministers of defense and 
interior. Other key positions include the Saudi ambassador to the United States and the 
United Kingdom. King Salman’s recent ascension to the throne and his subsequent 
rearrangement of the court complicates insight into this decision-making process. King 
Salman recently consolidated power by entrusting Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef 
with the newly formed council for political and security affairs and empowering Deputy 
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman with the council for economic and developmental 
affairs.282 Upon assuming the throne, King Salman also named his son, Mohammed bin 
Salman, the deputy crown prince over the current deputy, Prince Murqin. Since Prince 
                                                 
281 C. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia, 4.  
282 Ibid., 6.  
 100 
Mohammed bin Salman assumed his position, he has spearheaded rapid economic reform 
in his efforts to privatize the oil industry and shape long-term economic policy. Norman 
Cigar is apt in describing the Saudi monarchy as the monolithic “State” in the realist 
construct.283 
The Saudi military is inherently loyal in design, the defense minister is the crown 
prince, and personnel who display fealty to the King fill key military billets.284 The 
military is apolitical for the most part and is not a policy maker in the Saudi decision 
cycle. Intriguingly, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the minister of defense, serves as the 
vice-chairman on the supreme council of the King Abdullah City for Atomic and 
Renewable Energy (KACARE).285 The king established KACARE in 2010 as an ongoing 
effort to explore nuclear energy for Saudi Arabia’s ambitious nuclear energy plan. 
The nuclear scientific community is relatively nascent in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi 
government is seeking training opportunities abroad to develop the intellectual capital 
required to produce and maintain an atomic energy program. In 2013, in conjunction with 
a state visit to Riyadh by French President Francois Hollande, the French company 
Areva, known for its reprocessing efforts in Japan and China, signed a memorandum of 
agreement to train five Saudi businesses in the skills necessary for developing an atomic 
energy program.286  
Saudi Arabia does not have an internal bomb lobby such as that formed by 
Zulfiqar Bhutto and Munir Khan in Pakistan. Its politics has left a trail of ambiguity, 
which has set up a system reactive to Iranian overtures. In terms of political influence, 
Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is the actor to watch as some think he may 
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be the next king.287 He presides over defense and, as such, he is the co-chairman of 
KACARE.288 His attitudes and beliefs are paramount to the direction the future Saudi 
nuclear infrastructure takes. 
With absolute power residing in the monarchy, analyzing the interaction within 
the three traditional nuclear demand communities remains a challenge. If the Saudis are 
interested in nuclear pursuit, the arrangement is supportive as the military and Saudi 
scientific enterprises are subservient to the monarchy. Looking at the Saudi paradigm 
from the “nuclear mythmaking” perspective provides some limited insight. Since 2006, 
the Saudi family has its share of mythmakers that litter the landscape. Figure 9 depicts a 
sample of some of the popular public statements since 2006. In regards to emphasizing 
insecurities, the Saudis are quick to point out the vulnerabilities left by Iranian and Israeli 
nuclearization. Prince Muqrin’s statement in 2006 highlights the dangers of Israel’s 
arsenal while King Abdullah’s blunt statement makes it a foregone conclusion that the 
Kingdom will follow Iran’s lead should it pursue a weapon. In the recent years, Prince 
Turki Al Faisal has been quick to point out the need to counter the Iranian nuclear threat 
to the GCC. Al Faisal has also made statements that link Saudi nuclear-energy 
development to a strategy to offset Iran, but this is outside his tenure of official duties.289 
Since the JCPOA, the banter has died down, from seeking weapons if Iran broke out to 
matching residual enrichment capabilities.290 There is a progression through the cycle, 
but to what end is uncertain. Since King Salman’s ascension, a reshuffling of the royal 
family and consolidation of power has made discerning the Kingdom’s intent even more 
difficult. Complicating public understanding even further is the monarchy’s extensive 
                                                 
287 Guy Taylor, “Prince Mohammed bin Salman Being Groomed to Jump Succession Line, Claim 
Saudi Throne,” Washington Times, May 1, 2016, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/1/prince-mohammed-bin-salman-of-saudi-arabia-being-
g/. 
288 “The Establishing Order,” King Abdullah City. 
289 Drollette, “View from the Inside,” 22. 
290 David E. Sanger, “Saudi Arabia Promises to Match Iran in Nuclear Capability,” New York Times, 
May 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-promises-to-match-
iran-in-nuclear-capability.html. 
 102 
control over the media. The Kingdom frequently demonstrates its ability to arrest 
journalists for not reporting in line with the royal interest.291 This tight media control 
undermines the objectivity of Saudi media and leaves one to wonder whether they are 
reporting information or disinformation. Perhaps Abel Al-Jubier summarizes the 
normative state of Saudi Arabia, when he offers, “Saudi Arabia will do whatever it 
takes.”292 
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Figure 9.  Lavoy’s Cycle of Mythmaking Overlaid with Saudi Statements293  
The lessons of Pakistan and Japan point to specific individuals who have pushed 
the need for nuclear development. Zulfiqar Bhutto pushed the Pakistani atomic energy 
community from nuclear-weapon exploration to pursuit in 1974. Prime Minister Eisaku 
Sato pushed for the 1968/70 Report, which underwrote its nuclear hedging strategy. 
Tough and ambiguous talk emerged from King Abdullah in the run-up to the JCPOA, but 
King Salman’s inner circle has been relatively mute since endorsing the deal. 
Considering Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman’s position to defense and as 
vice-chairman of KACARE, he will remain the individual to watch in regards to nuclear 
ambitions. 
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1. Technological Hurdles to a Credible Hedge  
If Saudi Arabia hopes to compete with Iran, it will have to compete with a nuclear 
program that began under the Shah through the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. Saudi 
Arabia faces the daunting task of building a capability from absolute zero in nuclear 
scientific work force and infrastructure. While many, such as Zakaria, place this beyond 
the grasp of the Kingdom, others counter with the fact that the United States produced a 
bomb in five years. This section explores the steps the Saudis have taken toward 
nuclearization since 2006 and ends by reviewing its strategic missile forces. 
The state of the Saudi Arabia’s nuclear structure is aspirational. It comprises 
grand plans to offset future energy shortfalls but little progress. Initially, Saudi Arabia 
approached nuclear energy as part of a broader effort with Gulf partners: Kuwait, 
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Oman. The partners enlisted the 
aid of the French, and even Iran offered to help develop this effort.294 In 2009, the Saudis 
established KACARE under royal decree of King Abdullah under the auspices of 
relieving the nation of its petrochemical dependency.295 Also in 2009, the Saudis enlisted 
the aid of the Swedish firm Pöyry to create a national strategy for KACARE that 
harnesses nuclear and other nonrenewable energy in both the short and long term.296 
Technically, this is a not a new effort as Saudi atomic research dates back to 1977 
through the King Abd Al-Aziz Center for Science and Technology (KAACST).297  
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In 2011, Saudi Arabia announced an ambitious plan to build 16 reactors by 
2040.298 In its pursuit of nuclear energy, Saudi Arabia has concluded nuclear agreements 
with Pakistan, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, Argentina, France, and South Korea to develop nuclear infrastructure and 
build these 16 nuclear energy reactors.299 The current plan under the 2030 Saudi Vision 
seeks roughly $80 billion to build the nuclear infrastructure.300 Saudi Arabia’s ambitious 
goals project it having the first reactor running by 2022. However, a Saudi–Argentinian 
joint venture was due to break ground this year but failed to materialize.301 The lack of 
urgency belies any Saudi urgency to compensate Iran’s progress. 
The biggest shortage the Saudis face in establishing a nuclear program is human 
capital. Investment in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) 
education has been lacking, and those who pursue higher education in STEM fields find 
that job opportunities within the Kingdom are nil.302 The unpopularity of nuclear 
research in Saudi Arabia has led to budget cuts and discouraged others from pursuing 
careers within the field.303 Efforts to change the course have yet to take hold; efforts 
include industrial exchanges and internships with companies such as Areva opening local 
offices in Riyadh to train the local workforce.304 In the case of the U.S. endeavor to 
pursue nuclear weapons, the United States mobilized its national brain trust, albeit with 
help from displaced immigrants, to produce a bomb rapidly. A Saudi Arabian effort 
would have to build or recruit the brain trust to start. Prince Turki al-Faisal has 
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recognized the gap in human capital and asserts that Saudi Arabia’s plan to develop 
nuclear energy will bring his country along just as the JCPOA expires.305  
In light of the success that Iran and Iraq had with missile attacks against each 
other in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia sought a missile capability itself to serve as a deterrent 
against future attacks. Initially rebuffed by the United States, Saudi Arabia purchased 
Chinese CSS-2 missiles and subsequently established the Saudi Strategic Missile 
Force.306 As recent as 2013, reports emerged of the Saudis upgrading their missiles to 
DF-21s with a recent parade displaying possible support equipment.307 While both the 
CSS-2 and DF-21 have nuclear variants, reports have emerged that the variants purchased 
by the Saudis are not nuclear capable. The importance of the Saudi missile force is the 
established command structure it represents should Saudi Arabia pursue nuclear 
weapons. 
2. Economic Factors 
The Saudi Arabian government seeks to implement economic reforms under its 
“Vision 2030,” which includes diversifying its industrial base away from oil, developing 
the investment sector, and serving as connector for European-Asian-African trade.308 It is 
a relatively vulnerable time for Saudi Arabia as it seeks to increase its market share in oil 
exports, deny Iran a market share, wage war in Yemen, counter Iranian influences, and 
reform its economy. This section briefly explores the implications of Saudi oil policy and 
the goals of economic reform. 
Once a swing producer of oil that valued price stability over short-term profit, the 
current situation forces Saudi Arabia to overproduce to deny Iran increased profits from 
reentry into the oil market. Recently, Saudi Arabia has derailed oil production freeze 
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levels unless Iran agrees to the same.309 Saudi Arabia has long taken to a stance of not 
using oil as a weapon, but this episode and the 1973 oil embargo clearly demonstrate to 
the contrary. This episode also provides insight into what would happen if roles reversed 
and Saudi Arabia was under international scrutiny for nuclear pursuit. Oil is the current 
engine of the Saudi economy; if Saudi Arabia were to receive international sanctions for 
suspected nuclear pursuit, international sales may swing to its rival Iran and stifle Saudi 
economic reform. 
Saudi energy diversification provides a reasonable rationale for government 
investment in renewable energy such as in solar and nuclear sectors. The projected goals 
of 2030 that seek to shift oil for export and manufacturing use versus national 
consumption supports this ambitious alternative energy strategy. Financial experts, such 
as Citigroup, predict that if Saudi Arabia does not curb domestic consumption of oil, it 
could become a net oil importer by 2030.310 Saudi Arabia seeks to produce 9.5 gigawatts 
of renewable power by 2030 to balance its energy industry. The development of 16 
reactors support this concept. 
Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” also declares national intent to develop a domestic 
defense manufacturing industry. It cites a goal of shifting the imbalance of its two-
percent domestic production to an ambitious goal of 50 percent.311 Saudi Arabia seeks to 
transform its existing military industrial base from parts supply to more advanced items 
such as aircraft.312 Much like Pakistan, it seeks technology transfers to enable self-
reliance.  
As Prince Mohammed bin Salman seeks to guide his country through these 
ambitious transformations, he takes on significant national debt. Recently, Saudi Arabia 
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has sought more than $8 billion in loans from international lenders.313 It further plans an 
unprecedented bond sale of $15 billion in late 2016.314 The Kingdom ventured to offer 
up to five percent of Saudi Aramco to the public in a forthcoming IPO with an 
unprecedented expected value of $150 billion.315 Some attribute the Kingdom’s 
onboarding of debt and drastic changes to the oil crash, which depleted Saudi Arabia’s 
$100 billion surplus, as proof positive of a crumbling oil economy. A counter argument is 
that Saudi Arabia is all in for its “Vision 2030.” The implications of recent economic 
developments are that they establish a credible backdrop for its increased investment in 
nuclear energy while increasing foreign development interests that may make global 
leaders think twice before sanctions should Saudi Arabia experiment in nuclear pursuits. 
E. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
Saudi Arabian attitudes toward nonproliferation mirror Pakistan’s initial approach 
in the 1970s toward India in that both countries view nonproliferation regimes as useful 
only if they generate security advantages. For example, Saudi Arabia sought a position of 
parity with Israel and agreed to sign the NPT as soon as Israel did.316 The Saudis had to 
abandon this approach after they purchased Chinese CSS-2 missiles. The United States 
highlighted to Prince Bandar that the purchase made Saudi Arabia a pronounced threat to 
Israel and subject to attack should war erupt in the Middle East.317 The purchase has also 
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had downstream effects on pending U.S.–Saudi arms purchases; to assuage anger in 
Washington and put U.S.–Saudi arms deals back on track, King Fahd signed the NPT.318  
Since joining the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1988, Saudi Arabia endorsed several 
nonproliferation and counter-proliferation initiatives such as the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative.319 Saudi Arabia 
concluded the comprehensive safeguards agreement in 2009 and signed a small quantities 
protocol (SQP). The United States and the European Union argued against signing the 
SQP because it allowed the Kingdom to take advantage of a 1970s-era regime that was 
not as restrictive and exempted many inspection requirements.320 To date, Saudi Arabia 
has not signed the additional protocol that Iran agreed to under the JCPOA. This will be a 
revisited issue when Saudi Arabia goes to put its energy plan into effect. 
Saudi Arabia has been vocal about extending a nuclear weapon–free zone 
throughout the Middle East. Once again, this is an attempt to improve its security by 
denying others what the Saudis do not have. It has been part of a proposal to the UN as 
recently as 2013 calling for a “Middle East Free from Nuclear Weapons and all other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.”321 This is one area in which both Iran and Saudi Arabia 
find congruence to apply pressure on Israel and its undeclared nuclear arsenal. 
For the most part, Saudi Arabia is an upstanding member of the nonproliferation 
community. It is pragmatic in its approach to nonproliferation and advocates enforcing 
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the existing rules and laws concerning proliferation.322 Stated another way, Saudi Arabia 
does not actively seek any agreements that limit future nuclear decision-making to “do 
whatever it takes” regarding its security. 
F. CONCLUSION: A HEDGE ONLY IF, WHEN, AND HOW IT IS BUILT  
The implication of an eventual nuclear Iran coupled with a Saudi Arabia currently 
engaging Iranian-backed Houthis on its border clearly establishes a threat to Saudi 
Arabia. The monarchy’s “whatever they have, we’ll have,” position in the aftermath of 
the JCPOA underscores the Saudi Arabian urge to compensate. Unfortunately, the Saudis 
lack the technological capability to compete. Saudi Arabia’s lack of a technical base, 
particularly its malnourished STEM community, hampers its efforts and has a 
downstream effect on its desires to build a competing nuclear infrastructure. Its years of 
scientific underdevelopment preclude it from rapidly establishing the indigenous 
capability to produce nuclear weapons in a relatively short period as demanded by a 
nuclear hedging strategy. The best it can hope to do is build the technical base proposed 
in “Vision 2030,” which may establish a nascent capability to hedge. Figure 10 depicts 
that despite a high threat from Iran, Saudi technological capabilities hinder its 
progression toward hedging and force it into a default position of nuclear restraint. This 
section concludes this chapter by using the past case studies to explore what would 
indicate Saudi nuclear hedging. 
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Figure 10.  Saudi Arabian Nuclear Hedge Factors 
Saudi Arabia’s approach to this point has been sluggish. Its exploration of nuclear 
energy started in 2006 and has advanced in fits and starts ever since. A decade and an 
ambitious energy plan later, the Saudis have yet to put a shovel in the ground. The 
number one indicator of a change in Saudi Arabian policy would be progress toward its 
first reactor, and the type and origin of reactor would provide some indication of 
intention. Perhaps it would seek to imitate the Arak heavy-water reactor in Iran. Given 
that Saudi Arabia has yet to sign the additional protocol, its approach to IAEA safeguards 
in proposed design may prove a further indicator of intent. The initial Pakistani approach 
illuminates the relevance of initial procurement of nuclear infrastructure to a future 
weapons program. Perhaps, one would see the desire for parallel construction of nuclear 
facilities as demonstrated by the Pakistani experience.  
Once the first reactors are constructed, an interest in energy security that 
manifests in an enrichment capability to offset Iran or a push toward nuclear reprocessing 
may provide an indicator toward hedging. Another indicator would be Saudi Arabia’s 
final choice of vendor for nuclear power. Pakistan’s partnership with China has proven 
beneficial to its nuclear program over the years. The preexisting missile relationship with 
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the Chinese may offer a foundation to build upon, but while Saudi Arabia is a Chinese 
energy partner, it does fill a strategic need the way Pakistan does. The Saudi approach to 
who runs its program may serve as an indicator as well. For example, a situation in which 
Saudi Arabia recruits a large proportion of its nuclear scientists from nuclear weapons 
states, such as Pakistan, Russia, or China, may be indicative of the direction the program 
seeks to take. 
The development of the Saudi military industrial complex and how and what it 
chooses to produce is important. Development of dual-use aircraft or indigenous missile 
technology as its nuclear infrastructure progresses would serve as an indicator of the 
parallel development of delivery systems such as in the Pakistani case. The Japanese case 
has indicated that the development of space vehicles lends credibility to a hedge; perhaps 
an unlikely emergence of an indigenous Saudi space program would provide access to 
dual-use technology required to deliver a nuclear weapon. As with the nuclear energy 
development, the nature of industrial assistance can determine the trajectory; 
collaboration between the Chinese and Pakistanis help establish the Pakistan’s military-
industrial base. Perhaps a similar partnership would elucidate the direction of travel a 
Saudi program takes. 
In summary, Saudi Arabia lacks the nuclear foundation and the supporting 
intellectual capital to pursue the indigenous nuclear program required for a nuclear 
hedging strategy. This position does not discredit the Saudi ability to overcome these 
barriers but purports that when Saudi Arabia breaks ground on its first nuclear reactor, an 
immediate reevaluation of the Saudi Arabian position is required. As Saudi Arabia 
progresses toward its energy plan, careful consideration should be given to the nations 
that assist it, the background of foreign scientists involved, the manner of construction of 
a nuclear complex, the desire for a fuel cycle, the attitudes displayed toward the IAEA 






The intent of this thesis was to answer the questions of how the JCPOA affects 
Saudi Arabia and what actions the Saudis are likely to take as a result. The JCPOA left 
Iran with a residual capability that allows for the rapid development of nuclear weapons 
in a relatively short time, from months to years. The Saudi premise of “whatever they 
have, we will have” leans toward a Saudi Arabian nuclear-hedging strategy, but is such a 
strategy feasible? What does Saudi policy look like if Saudi Arabia chooses to match 
Iran? This thesis attempted to answer these questions by use of a model exploring the 
interaction of threat, domestic factors, such as national will and technical capability, and 
current international nonproliferation regimes as they pertain to nuclear hedging. This 
model proposed that high factors of threat drive nations to proliferate; domestic factors 
enable nations to proliferate; and international regimes moderate threats and provide 
reasons to reconsider proliferation. The interaction and strength of these forces determine 
the extent of proliferation, in other words, pursuit, restraint, or nuclear hedging. This 
chapter summarizes this approach and concludes with findings to these questions.  
1. One Model, Three Different Cases, Three Different Outcomes 
The proposed model explores the interaction between the factors of threat, 
domestic concerns, and international regimes. It proposes that within the calculation of 
threat, factors such as aggression, aggregate power, offensive power, proximity of 
regional adversaries, and the ability to offset with nuclear allies weigh heavily into the 
national calculus to entertain nuclear weapons. It also contends that domestic factors, 
such as the will of the people, expressed through political, military, and scientific 
communities, balanced by resident technical capabilities and economic concern, can 
affect the feasibility of a nuclear program. The third factor focuses on the attitudes and 
participation toward international regimes and the benefits of continued adherence or the 
consequences of deviation. It proposes within the intersection of these three factors that a 
propensity to adopt a policy of nuclear hedging exists. Chapter II explored the factors for 
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developing a conceptual model of proliferation states that weighed international relations 
and current proliferation theories. Chapter III applied the model to Pakistan, a state that in 
the face of a nuclear threat sought nuclear weapons. Chapter IV applied the model to 
Japan, a hedge state that possesses the prerequisite capacity to develop nuclear weapons 
rapidly yet refrains from doing so. Chapter V applied the model to Saudi Arabia, 
identifying a state that desires to compensate, but its infrastructure and consequences of 
action prohibit it from moving forward. Each case demonstrates a state at a different 
station of nuclear proliferation: a proliferent, a hedge, and restraint by default. 
In the case of Pakistan, the advent of India’s Trombay reprocessing capability in 
1965 was not enough for Zulfiqar Bhutto’s bomb lobby to convince President Ayub Khan 
to explore nuclear weapons. It took a change in leadership, the trouncing of the Pakistani 
Army by India in 1971, and a peaceful Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 to coalesce 
national resolve to seek nuclear weapons. In light of these events, Pakistan mobilized the 
military, scientific, and political communities to bridge seemingly insurmountable gaps to 
achieve nuclear parity with India. Zulfiqar Bhutto led the nation toward this goal by 
reducing government bureaucratic barriers and seeking international investment to fund 
the endeavor. The military supported the procurement ring and technological transfers 
that enabled the scientific community to produce a bomb. The scientific community was 
impoverished in facilities and material but not in intellectual capacity. The Atoms for 
Peace project helped develop a nuclear scientific community that established its 
technological base. The Pakistanis viewed nonproliferation regimes as bigoted toward 
lesser-developed nations and a hurdle to jump over—the nation subsequently developed a 
norm of “norm defiance.” 
In Pakistan, the element of threat united the nation to pursue nuclear weapons 
over the benefits of existing relationships and international regimes. Misaligned alliances 
tilted Pakistan toward security independence through proliferation. The United States 
sought to counter Soviet influence in South Asia while Pakistan needed security vis-á-vis 
India. The immediacy of countering the threat with India opened the door for foreign 
collaboration, such as with China, which greatly enabled the program. Existential threats 
and the favorable domestic factors of bureaucratic cohesiveness forged a Pakistani 
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national unity that overcame the negative consequences of economic loss and potential 
reproach to negate the coercive power of international regimes.  
Japan’s experience differed greatly from Pakistan. Post–World War II Japan 
emerged with a predetermined security arrangement with the United States. This 
arrangement allowed the Japanese to focus on economic recovery, and the Japanese 
further codified it through its Yoshida Doctrine. The mutual defense of this agreement 
converged interests in countering communism, a proximate threat to Japan emanating 
from China, the USSR, and North Korea. In the 1950s, the United States introduced the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy to Japan under the Atoms for Peace plan to offset the 
negative images of the U.S. hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll, and a nuclear energy 
industry soon emerged. In the aftermath of the Chinese nuclear test of 1964, Prime 
Minister Sato was able to review the feasibility of nuclear weapons based on the 
indigenous nuclear capacity resident in Japan. This study was important to shaping the 
hedge seen in Japan today. It identified the cost of continued reliance on U.S. security, 
both materially and strategically, and an independent deterrent. Japan developed a variant 
of the first option by advocating security dependence on the United States while 
encouraging the development of nuclear infrastructure necessary for its hedge.  
Japan’s accession to the NPT was remarkable for the informal guarantee seeking 
from the United States that the NPT would not affect its ability to reprocess plutonium. 
This was instrumental to its hedging strategy as reprocessing gives Japan rapid and 
independent access to plutonium should it revisit its position on nuclear pursuit. With the 
rising threat of a nuclear North Korea and an increasingly assertive China, Japanese 
politicians, such as Shinzo Abe, are encouraging the discussion of an independent nuclear 
deterrent. This is an emotional issue for the Japanese as it is the only nation to have 
suffered from atomic bombings. These bombings left an indelible scar on the Japanese 
psyche that has led the population to abhor nuclear weaponry. Scholars refer to this 
phenomenon as the “nuclear allergy.” This allergy makes Japan a staunch 
nonproliferation advocate and creates domestic friction between the people and 
government when the topic arises.  
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Today, Japan leverages its hedge to ensure synchronicity of U.S.–Japanese 
security concerns. Its formidable domestic factors, such as a foreign-trade dependent 
economy and the political discord from its population, coupled with its nuclear allergy 
and high regard for nonproliferation norms, counter-balance the security incentives of 
nuclear pursuit. Meanwhile, Japan’s domestic nuclear capacity and its ability to produce 
an indigenous nuclear weapon rapidly create a fertile environment for nuclear pursuit 
should its threat calculus spike and domestic and international barriers recede.  
The Iranian nuclear drama sparked another dimension of regional competition 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The signing of the JCPOA highlighted the advanced state 
of Iran’s nuclear program while leaving a residual nuclear hedging capability in Iran. 
From the realist perspective of security that is prevalent in the Middle East, any perceived 
gain comes at a loss for another state. As such, Saudi Arabia finds itself engaged with 
Iran on multiple fronts besides nuclear competition. The first is the battle for influence in 
Iraqi politics; the second is on its border against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen; 
the third is in Syria, where Saudis would like to see Assad ousted; and the fourth is in 
Lebanon, where each nation courts Hamas. In 2016, the Iranian–Saudi relationship hit an 
all-time low when the Iranians stormed the Saudi mission in Teheran, setting it ablaze 
after the Saudis beheaded a prominent Shia cleric. Compounding matters with Iran, Saudi 
Arabia has to contend with the growing specter of ISIS challenging the legitimacy of the 
Kingdom. Saudi Arabia also harbors doubts about its traditional security partner, the 
United States—stemming from its willingness to deal with Iran—and seeks to mend 
relationships with its traditional security partner Pakistan.  
In the run up to the signing of the JCPOA, Saudi Arabia voiced its desire to 
compensate, but there remains a rift between talk and action. As Saudi Arabia explores 
what it takes to compensate, it finds the daunting task of building nuclear capacity from 
an empty cupboard of indigenous nuclear scientists and a nonexistent nuclear 
infrastructure. It also finds an economy that is in transition and a military engaged with 
Iranian proxies. While threat is high, there remains a lack of national infrastructure to 
match the leadership’s desire to match nuclear capability vis-à-vis Iran. Furthermore, 
Saudi Arabia’s slow progress toward building a nuclear enterprise indicates a lack of 
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urgency in compensating for Iran. While Saudi Arabia is a signatory of the NPT, its 
declarative statements indicate it would not hesitate to deviate.  
The Iranian threat motivates Saudi Arabia to compensate. Iran presents a local, 
aggressive, and formidable threat that, after the JCPOA, emerges from international 
sanctions in a position to enhance its military and latent strengths. Saudi allies provide 
questionable reassurance to the protector of the Muslim holy land. International regimes 
seem unlikely to dissuade Saudi Arabia from matching Iran, but domestic factors, 
specifically a malnourished scientific community, hinder the Saudis’ hedging options. 
Subsequently, the technical challenges force Saudi Arabia to accept a default position of 
nuclear restraint.  
This thesis explored three different cases to conclude the approach a nation takes 
toward nuclear weapons—pursuit, hedging, or restraint—is determined by the interaction 
of three factors: threat, domestic factors, and international regimes. The  findings suggest 
that Saudi Arabia, while currently adopting a position of restraint, is unlikely to continue 
that strategy if it feels sufficiently threatened by Iran. Figure 11 offers an abbreviated 
comparison of the cases and highlights the differences among factors in each case. In 
Pakistan’s case, alliances did not offset the Indian threat. Domestically its bureaucracy 
aligned in favor of nuclear pursuit. It did not have a strong nuclear enterprise, but it had 
the intellectual capacity to develop the program. It sought creative ways to collaborate for 
technological transfers and mobilized the Arab community to finance the endeavor. The 
newly formed NPT and threat of international sanctions does not undermine Pakistan’s 
determination to pursue weapons. Japan represents a country living under the threat of 
nuclear shadows that can go nuclear—but asks whether it should it go nuclear. In its 
calculus, Japan places value on the extended deterrence of the United States and seeks 
innovative ways to guarantee that U.S. and Japanese security interests converge. While 
Japan has the tools to go nuclear, politicians face angering a public who is supportive of 
nonproliferation norms based on the national nuclear allergy stemming from the end of 
World War II. In Japan, the discord between threat and domestic factors that is enhanced 
by nonproliferation norms creates an environment for nuclear hedging. Saudi Arabia 
represents a nation that indicates it would like to hedge to match its adversary’s capability 
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regardless of international regimes. Despite its desire, the Saudis’ technical capacity and 
transitory economy limit its ability to compete with Iran. These factors combine to leave 
Saudi Arabia in a default position of nuclear restraint.  
 
Figure 11.  Side-by-Side Case Study Comparison 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
The previous section answered the main thesis question of how the Iranians 
motivated Saudi Arabia to acquire a nuclear capability to match or surpass their own and 
highlighted the Saudi Arabian inability to compete. This section explores the reoccurring 
themes of alliances and technological capability and concludes with a checklist for an 
emerging Saudi nuclear infrastructure should the shovel hit the ground. 
1. Alliances Matter 
In all cases, the United States is prevalent in the security paradigms. Pakistan has 
viewed the United States as a counter to India whereas the United States has viewed 
Pakistan as part of its bulwark to communism. This incongruity has manifested in 
Pakistan’s defeat at the hands of the Indians. This defeat has led to a desire for Pakistani 
security independence.  
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In Japan, the United States alliance is valued and congruent with the threats Japan 
faces. Japan reemerged from World War II dependent on the United States for security. 
As new threats, such as China, emerged, the United States was quick to allay Japanese 
fears with the extension of its nuclear umbrella. At roughly the same time, Japanese 
leadership had the foresight to invest in the necessary capabilities to create the capacity to 
build nuclear weapons should U.S. security guarantees ebb. Japan has perfected the 
maintenance of this alliance, and each time a new threat emerges, talk of a Japanese 
deterrent is usually enough to reaffirm U.S. security guarantees. 
In Saudi Arabia, the value of U.S. security treads water. On one hand, the Saudis 
question the U.S.-led efforts to make a deal with Iran at the expense of their security. On 
the other hand, U.S. armaments fuel Saudi Arabia’s penchant for high-tech weaponry and 
current fight in Yemen. Increased U.S. dialogue with Iran or even rapprochement could 
cause a divergence in the U.S.–Saudi relationship. Saudi Arabia’s development of its own 
defense industry as described in “Vision 2030,” or shifting equipping and training of its 
armed forces to another country such as Pakistan would indicate the declining value of 
the U.S.–Saudi alliance and signal a Saudi move toward security independence.   
2. Technology Matters 
The Pakistan case study elucidates the importance of specialized personnel to 
enable a nuclear program. Pakistan’s intellectual capacity has fueled its capacity to go 
nuclear. Japan’s advanced nuclear fuel cycle and its standing as a technologically 
advanced nation serves as a backbone to its nuclear hedge. It is not a matter of whether 
they can produce a bomb but when they choose to do so. Japan is often referred to as a 
virtual nuclear nation based on these facts. Understanding that Saudi Arabia lacks both 
the intellectual capacity and the development to field nuclear energy, Table 5 explores 




 Indicators and Warnings Table 5.  
Indicator  Warning  Rationale 
Alliances   
- Security interests  U.S. and Saudi approaches to Iran 
diverge.  
In the Pakistani case, diverging 
interests drove Pakistan to seek 
independent nuclear deterrence.  
- Security 
independence  
The nation is diversifying its military 
suppliers or seeking to establish its 
own military establishment. 
Pakistan felt the brunt of the arms 
embargo in 1965. Security 
interests emphasized the need for 





- Type of Reactor Saudi Arabia seeks a heavy-water 
reactor over a light-water reactor.  
Proliferation risks elevate with 
different reactor designs. Light-
water reactors pose less of a 
proliferation risk. 
- Country of Origin  Saudi Arabia seeks Russian or 
Chinese designs over Japanese, 
Korean, or U.S. designs.  
China has shown willingness to 
proliferate in the Pakistani case. 
Russia has provided Iran’s current 
nuclear reactors 
- Nuclear fuel cycle Saudi Arabia asserts its right to enrich 
or reprocess. 
These technologies enable the 
development of highly enriched 
uranium and plutonium.  
- Parallel 
Construction 
Saudi Arabia seeks to build mirrored 
capabilities elsewhere. 
Pakistan took this approach in the 
1970s.  It sought to import 
nuclear technologies to mirror in 






Saudi Arabia sends students abroad to 
acquire education in supporting 
disciplines (e.g., metallurgy, nuclear 
chemical, and explosive engineering). 
An increased effort to develop an 
indigenous scientific base may 
indicate proliferation. It is also 
important as to where education 
takes place. Exchange with 




Saudi Arabia seeks foreign scientists 
from a country with established 
nuclear weapons program 
An influx of foreign scientists and 
their background may indicate the 
nature of the direction of a Saudi 
Arabian nuclear program.  
Chinese assistance was vital in 






C. FINAL WORDS 
Through case study exploration, this thesis found that threat favors nuclear 
pursuit, and threat may be mitigated by an alliance with a nuclear nation whose security 
interests converge. This thesis also found that nations facing nuclear threat without 
favorable domestic factors, such as supporting bureaucracies or technological 
capabilities, are forced into a default position of nuclear restraint. In cases whereby threat 
and a majority of domestic factors support nuclear pursuit, such as in Japan, international 
regimes and security alliances provide incentives to adopt a nuclear hedge versus nuclear 
pursuit. In the case of Saudi Arabia, a high threat and tenuous alliances favor nuclear 
pursuit, but underdeveloped domestic factors, such as a lacking scientific community and 
nuclear infrastructure, force a policy of restraint. Saudi Arabia’s attitude toward 
international regimes portends that the country will seek weapons if it possesses the key 
technological requirements. Under these circumstances, nuclear energy and technological 
development in Saudi Arabia deserves constant evaluation. The value of this thesis is that 
it offers a qualitative method for comparing and contrasting past and contemporary 
proliferation cases against a current proliferation concern to develop a deeper 
understanding. While this thesis focused on the Iranian–Saudi Arabian relationship, the 
residual capability in Iran may drive other nations, such as Egypt and the United Arab 
Emirates, to seek similar approaches—and these cases will deserve similar evaluation.  
1. DOD Implications 
In 2014, the Department of Defense published a countering weapons of mass 
destruction (CWMD) strategy focused on the strategic ends of denying state and non-
state WMD acquisition, use, and—if used—mitigation.323 To achieve these effects, the 
DOD seeks to reduce incentives for actors that own and use WMDs; increase the 
difficulty in acquisition and use of WMDs; manage WMD risk from failed or failing 
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nations; and deny the effects of WMD use.324 This strategy has provided the overarching 
guidance for the enterprise, particularly the United States Strategic Command, the 
functional combatant commander (FCC) for CWMD. Meanwhile, the United Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) has planned and prepared to execute WMD crisis 
response and is responsible for conducting operational preparation of the environment 
for the Geographic Combatant Commanders. This has created a disconnect between the 
side of the FCC responsible for planning for CWMD eventualities and the side of the 
FCC responsible for training, manning, and equipping the force to prepare to respond to 
WMD crises.  
The president’s recent shift of countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) 
responsibilities to the United Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) from the 
United States Strategic Command at the behest of the Secretary of Defense represents an 
evolution of the DOD policy. USSOCOM’s traditional role in CWMD is responding to 
crisis to delay, disrupt, destroy, or neutralize WMDs. As USSOCOM takes on expanded 
CWMD tasks, it will need to need to understand the contemporary operating environment 
to develop strategies and capabilities to leverage against current and future proliferants. 
Developing these strategies demands a deeper understanding of proliferating nations and 
non-state actors. This deeper understanding informs senior decision-makers when 
allocating scarce resources already arrayed against pressing terrorism threats—such as 
ISIS. Detailed studies will inform senior leadership as it contemplates strategies to 
address new mission requirements. This thesis is part of developing that deeper 
understanding.  
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